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Abstract
This thesis consists of two independent chapters.
The first chapter investigates the effects of a change in the taxation system from
joint to separate taxation on households’ labour supply, patterns of human capital
formation, and intra-household allocations of consumption between primary and
secondary earners. Household behaviour is described by an inter-temporal version
of the collective household model, where household members’ relative bargaining
power determines intra-household allocations of consumption. Household mem-
bers have limited commitment over future allocations, and their bargaining power
evolves endogenously in response to changes in the gains from marriage. The tax
reform is shown to cause an internal redistribution of consumption from primary to
secondary earners in households where the bargaining power of secondary earners is
low. Following a switch from joint to separate taxation, secondary earners’ labour
supply and stock of human capital are increased, which raises their value of divorce
against the value of staying in the marriage. This translates into a higher bargain-
ing power in the couple, and thus a higher share of secondary earners’ consumption
in the household.
The second chapter studies optimal monetary policy under loose commitment
in a model with staggered price and wage setting. Under loose commitment, the
policymaker commits to a policy plan but occasionally reneges on past promises
with an exogenously given probability. The probability of commitment is common
knowledge to the rational agents in the model, which makes central bank credibility
imperfect. The loose commitment framework allows the researcher to investigate
the relationship between credibility and welfare losses, measured by deviations
of output gap and inflation from their targets. When a central bank marginally
increases its credibility, welfare losses are reduced. The welfare gain is largely inde-
v
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pendent on the initial credibility level. Moreover, the output-inflation stabilisation
trade-off and the response of endogenous variables to exogenous shocks change
with the degree of commitment.
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Chapter 1
Household Taxation and
Intra-household Redistributions
of Consumption in a Limited
Commitment Household model
1.1 Introduction
How governments should tax labour income is an important question that is often
raised by academics and policy makers alike. The design of taxation systems
affects households’ labour supply, consumption and savings decisions, and other
economic outcomes with various implications for government budgeting decisions,
as well as households welfare. Most of the economic literature focuses on key
aspects such as the level of tax rates or the progressivity of the tax schedule,
whereas relatively fewer studies are concerned with who should be the unit of
taxation, either households or individuals. Some countries consider households as
the relevant unit of taxation, while other countries choose individuals to be the
unit of taxation. If households are the unit of taxation, a system known as joint
taxation or joint filing, household members file their labour earnings jointly. If
individuals are the unit of taxation, a system known as separate taxation or single
1
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filing, household members file their labour earnings as separate individuals.1
This distinction is central to determine the effective income tax rates that
primary and secondary earners face when making labour supply decisions. In
countries which adopt a joint taxation system, e.g. United States or Germany,
the average tax rate on secondary earners’ income is higher than the tax rate they
would face if they were single or they filed income independently.2 This differ-
ence in tax rates across countries has been shown to be important in explaining
the cross-country variation of primary and secondary earners’ labour supply, with
secondary earners working relatively more hours in countries where spouses file
income separately (Bick and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2017, 2018). The intuition behind
this result is simple; since secondary earners are facing a relatively higher tax
rate on additional earnings when income is filed jointly, the optimal decision is to
limit their labour supply and invest their time in other activities such as caring
for children and home production. The policy implication is also straightforward;
switching from joint to single filing would create the right incentives for secondary
earners to increase their labour force participation, with positive effects on house-
holds income, consumption, and aggregate labour supply (Guner et al., 2012a).
A change in the taxation system from joint to separate taxation is likely to
have an impact on other important outcomes that have been partially ignored
by the literature, namely the stock of human capital of primary and secondary
earners, their bargaining power within the household, and the intra-household
allocation of consumption. If secondary earners successfully increase their labour
force participation, their experience in the labour market and labour productivity
increases through learning-by-doing, which ultimately translates into higher wages
and improved career prospects. As secondary earners’ contribution to households
resources increases, it is reasonable to expect their bargaining power in the couple
and weight in household decisions to increase as well.
1The sharp division of taxation systems into joint and single filing is a simplification of actual
taxation systems. Some countries, e.g. Italy, adopt separate taxation but allow tax credits to be
transferable across spouses. Other countries, e.g. United States, adopt joint taxation but give
households the option to file income separately. In this paper, I assume a clear distinction between
joint and separate taxation systems, and I characterise both systems independently. This allows
me to investigate how the intrinsic properties of either taxation system impact the variables of
interest.
2The opposite is true for primary earners; when income is filed jointly, the tax rate on primary
earners’ income is lower than the tax rate they would face under single filing.
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In order to measure these effects, the choice of model is crucial. Standard
unitary household models used in the literature fail to account for changes in
the bargaining power and intra-household allocations as they abstract from the
internal decision making process, often seen as irrelevant or unimportant (Apps
and Rees, 1988, 1999). The implicit assumption is that households’ decisions on
internal allocations of consumption and leisure are orthogonal to external factors,
and thus unaffected by the tax reform. On the contrary, collective household
models (Chiappori, 1988, 1992) explicitly model household members’ bargaining
power in the internal decision making process and allow changes in external factors
to influence households’ decisions. As a result, the collective household model is
better suited to identify changes in the bargaining power of household members
and intra-household allocations.
This paper documents the effects of switching from joint to separate taxation on
labour supply, human capital, and intra-household allocations of consumption in
an economy where household behaviour is modelled as in the collective household
model. More precisely, the model is an intertemporal version of the collective
household model where household members have limited commitment to future
allocations of consumption and leisure (Mazzocco, 2007). Household members’
bargaining power evolves endogenously and is characterised by the size of the
Pareto weight on individual utility, with a higher Pareto weight being associated
to a higher bargaining power. The choice of model is motivated by two important
features. First, the explicit modelling of household members’ individual preferences
allows me to study how the tax reform influences the internal decision process,
and thus how consumption and leisure is allocated between members. Second,
the intertemporal dimension is necessary to explain how labour supply decisions
translate into human capital formation of primary and secondary earners. The
interplay between these two features is key to uncover some mechanisms that would
otherwise be absent in a standard model.
In particular, human capital accumulation is the key channel through which the
tax reform affects intra-household allocations. When the taxation system changes
from joint to single filing, the unit of taxation becomes the individual and the
marginal tax rate on secondary earners’ income is reduced. Lower marginal tax
rates create an incentive for secondary earners to increase their labour supply,
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which ultimately translates into a higher stock of human capital through learning-
by-doing. Higher human capital increases secondary earners’ value of the outside
option (divorce) which makes the participation constraint of the limited commit-
ment marriage contract more likely to bind, thus the Pareto weight on secondary
earners’ utility to increase. Higher bargaining power translates into a larger share
of private consumption in the household.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the related literature.
Section 1.3 compares joint and separate taxation systems and comments on the
potential implications for households’ labour supply and income in a simple frame-
work. Section 1.4 introduces the model. Section 1.5 reports the quantitative res-
ults. Section 1.6 discusses the sensitivity of the results to key assumptions in the
model. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Related literature
The relationship between the tax treatment of households and labour supply has
received increased attention in the literature. Guner et al. (2012a) quantitatively
document how household labour supply responds to changes in the tax system.
Using an overlapping generations life-cycle model calibrated to U.S. data, they
show how a switch from joint to single filing has a positive effect on aggregate
labour supply with the bulk of the adjustment in hours coming from the increased
labour force participation of married women.3 Bick and Fuchs-Schündeln (2017,
2018) use data from Unites States and 17 European countries to document how
cross-country differences in the tax treatment of married couples correspond to
cross-country differences in the labour supply of married men and women. Simil-
arly to Guner et al. (2012a), they show that the household tax treatment (joint or
single filing), along with the progressivity of the tax schedule, is crucial to explain
the hours gap between married men and women. Chade and Ventura (2002, 2005)
develop a marriage-market model with endogenous marital choices and labour sup-
ply decisions to investigate several tax reforms aimed at removing marriage tax bo-
3In Guner et al. (2012a), the increase in married women’s labour supply and the associated
increase in aggregate labour supply are mainly driven by the extensive margin. In comparison,
this paper shows that in a model with an intensive margin, the increase in secondary earners’
labour supply and the effect on aggregate labour supply are more muted.
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nuses or penalties, including a change from joint to individual taxation. They find
that the tax reform has significant positive effects on the labour supply of married
females, while the effect on marriage formation and dissolution is uncertain and
quantitatively small.
On the normative side, Karabarbounis (2016) studies the optimal tax system
in an economy where households file jointly or separately depending on the number
of working members in the household. Kleven et al. (2009) show that the optimal
taxation of couples is dependent on secondary earners’ relative labour productivity
in the market and in home production, and that the optimal marginal tax rate on
secondary earners’ income should be declining in primary earners’ income. Gayle
and Shephard (2019) argue that a taxation system where households file income
jointly along with a progressive tax can create substantial marriage bonuses or
penalties; therefore, they develop an equilibrium collective marriage market and
consider an optimal design problem where the planner is allowed to adjust the tax
jointness of the tax schedule of married couples. Their analysis seems to confirm
the result of Kleven et al. (2009) that the optimal tax system is characterised by
a certain degree of negative jointness, hence the tax rate on secondary earners’
income should be lower when primary earners’ income is higher.
While the literature recognises the disincentives created by a joint taxation sys-
tem on secondary earners’ labour force participation and highlights the potential
benefits of switching to individual taxation, only relatively few studies consider the
effects of a tax reform aimed at removing such disincentives on household members’
bargaining power, intra-household allocations, and individual well-being.4 Never-
theless, the interplay between households’ internal decision making process and
the taxation system has been shown to matter, with one affecting the other in
important ways. Alesina et al. (2011) and Bastani (2013) explore gender-based
taxation in a framework that allows for explicit bargaining of intra-household al-
locations between household members. Obermeier (2019) studies the impact of tax
progressivity on the inequality of consumption, leisure, and individual well-being
4Most of the tax reforms discussed in the literature aim to remove the disincentive effects
on secondary earners’ labour supply by reducing the marginal tax rate on secondary earners’
income. Examples of such reforms include gender-based taxation (Alesina et al., 2011; Guner
et al., 2012b; Bastani, 2013), proportional (flat) taxation (Guner et al., 2012a), and secondary
earners’ tax deductions.
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within and across households. Oikonomou and Siegel (2015) show how labour in-
come taxes, along with capital taxes, directly influence the intra-household risk
sharing possibilities of married couples, and thus the intra-household allocations
of consumption and leisure.
This paper is closely related to Gayle and Shephard (2019) and Bronson and
Mazzocco (2019). Gayle and Shephard (2019) show how the degree of tax jointness,
i.e. how one spouse’s marginal tax rate depends on the other spouse’s income, can
influence the equilibrium bargaining power of spouses that results from marriage
market clearing. Their analysis can correctly identify the labour supply responses
of primary and secondary earners to changes in the household tax treatment, but
it abstracts from inter-temporal aspects such as the accumulation of human cap-
ital and evolution of labour productivity, which are considered in this paper and
shown to be important. Bronson and Mazzocco (2019) investigate the effect of a
switch from joint to individual taxation on labour supply, home production, and
consumption using a framework similar to the one used in this paper. However,
they abstract from general equilibrium effects on market wages and prices that
might arise from potential movements in aggregate labour supply.
1.3 Joint versus separate taxation: definitions and com-
parison
In this section I compare joint taxation to separate taxation and discuss how these
alternative taxation systems can influence households’ labour supply, households’
tax liabilities, and households’ income.
Joint and separate taxation differ in how primary and secondary earners’ in-
come are treated for the purpose of calculating households’ tax liabilities. Under
joint taxation the unit of taxation is the household. Household members pool their
income and report their labour earnings as a single unit. For example, consider a
household with two members: a primary earner with labour income y1 and a sec-
ondary earner with labour income y2. Total tax liabilities T joint for the household
are given by
T joint
(
y1, y2
)
= 2T
(
y1 + y2
2
)
,
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where T is a tax function which allows for progressive taxation, and the tax base
is an average of primary and secondary earners’ income.5
Under separate taxation the unit of taxation is the individual. Each household
member separately reports their labour income, and tax liabilities are computed
based on each individual’s income. Total tax liabilities T sep for the household are
the sum of individual tax liabilities
T sep
(
y1, y2
)
= T (y1) + T (y2).
In what follows I compare joint and separate taxation and illustrate how these
alternative systems can influence household labour supply and income. Throughout
the analysis, I assume that the tax function T satisfies certain properties such as
convexity, monotonicity, and differentiability. Details are left to the Appendix,
where the reader can find a formal definition of the tax function and its properties.
1.3.1 Marginal tax rates and household labour supply
Marginal tax rates on individual household members’ income depend on the tax
system in place and the progressivity of the tax function T . Under joint taxation,
the marginal tax rates on primary and secondary earners’ incomes are given by
∂T joint
(
y1, y2
)
∂y1
=
∂T joint
(
y1, y2
)
∂y2
= T ′
(
y1 + y2
2
)
,
while under separate taxation the marginal tax rates are respectively
∂T sep
(
y1, y2
)
∂y1
= T ′ (y1) , ∂T sep (y1, y2)
∂y2
= T ′ (y2) ,
where T ′ (·) denotes the first derivative of the tax function T (·).
Notice that under joint filing, the tax base is a function of both primary and
secondary earner’s income. As Figure 1.1 shows, any marginal increase in income
5In this paper, tax liabilities under joint taxation are computed according to the income
splitting method where part of primary earners’ income is attributed to secondary earners’ income
and viceversa. Another method is income aggregation; primary and secondary earners’ income
are summed and the relevant tax rate is given by the tax bracket associated with the sum of
incomes. For the purpose of this paper both methods are equivalent, however income splitting is
preferred as it allows for an easier and direct comparison of joint and separate taxation systems.
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Figure 1.1: Taxation system and marginal tax rates
y 1 y2+
2
y2y ,1(       )T
y 2 y1 y2y ,1
(a) Joint taxation
y 2 y1 y2y ,1
y2y ,1(       )T
(b) Separate taxation
Notes: This figure shows a progressive tax function along with marginal tax rates on primary
and secondary earners’ income under joint and separate taxation. Marginal tax rates are given
by the tangent lines to the tax function corresponding the relevant tax base. Panel (a) shows the
marginal tax rates under joint taxation. Panel (b) shows the marginal tax rates under separate
taxation.
by either primary or secondary earners affects the tax base equally, and increases
household tax liabilities at the same rate. This implies that secondary earners’
marginal income is taxed at the same rate as primary earners’ marginal income.
Alternatively, under separate taxation any marginal increase in income by
either household member affects their individual tax liabilities only. That is,
primary and secondary earners’ marginal tax rates are determined by their own
income. As a result, the marginal increase in household tax liabilities depends
on which household member’s income is increasing; as long as the tax schedule is
progressive, the marginal increase in household tax liabilities following an increase
in secondary earners’ income is always less than the marginal increase following
an increase in primary earners’ income. Simply put, the marginal tax rate on sec-
ondary earners’ income is lower than the marginal tax rate on primary earners’
income.
Moreover, the marginal tax rate on primary and secondary earners’ income
under joint taxation always lies in between the corresponding marginal tax rates
under separate taxation.
Proposition 1. Let
(
y1, y2
) ∈ R2+ be any pair of primary and secondary earners’
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income, with y1 ≥ y2. Then
∂T sep
(
y1, y2
)
∂y2
≤ ∂T
joint
(
y1, y2
)
∂y2
=
∂T joint
(
y1, y2
)
∂y1
≤ ∂T
sep
(
y1, y2
)
∂y1
.
Proof. It follows from the monotonicity of the first derivative of the tax function.
See the Appendix for more details.
Different marginal tax rates across taxation systems imply that labour supply
choices of household members will depend on the taxation system in place. Under
joint taxation, secondary earners that want to increase their labour supply will face
a marginal tax rate on additional income that is higher than the marginal tax rate
under separate taxation. Therefore, under joint taxation there is a disincentive for
secondary earners to supply additional hours. A change in the tax system from
joint to single filing would lower the marginal tax rate on secondary earners’ income
and induce them to increase their labour supply.
Differences in hours worked under joint and separate taxation can be explained
by a simple static model of household labour supply. Consider, as an example, a
household composed of two members, a primary earner and a secondary earner.
Each household member, m ∈ {1, 2}, supplies hours to the labour market at wage
rate wm. By assumption, the primary earner in the household has a wage rate
w1 which is higher than the wage rate of the secondary earner w2. Household
members pool their labour income and pay taxes according to the tax system in
place. Total tax liabilities are denoted by T
(
y1, y2
)
. Formally, the household
solves the following maximisation problem:
max
{q,h1,h2}
ln q −
(
h1
)2
2
−
(
h2
)2
2
s.t. q + T
(
y1, y2
)
= y1 + y2
y1 = w1h1
y2 = w2h2
where h1 is the labour supply of the primary earner, h2 is the labour supply of the
secondary earner, and q is household consumption.
First order optimality conditions imply that the ratio of labour supply is given
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by
h2
h1
=
w2 (1− T2)
w1 (1− T1)
where Tm ≡ ∂T/∂ym denotes the marginal tax rate on member m’s labour income
under the tax system in place. As previously mentioned, the marginal tax rates
under joint and separate taxation differ, which means that the labour supply of
primary and secondary earners can be directly influenced by the tax system. De-
note by hmjoint the labour supply under joint taxation and h
m
sep the labour supply
under separate taxation. Also, let T jointm and T sepm be the marginal tax rates under
joint and separate taxation respectively. Proposition 1 ensures that the following
inequality holds:
h2sep
h1sep
=
w2
(
1− T sep2
)
w1
(
1− T sep1
) ≥ w2(1− T joint2 )
w1
(
1− T joint1
) = h2joint
h1joint
Because of the different marginal tax rates, under separate taxation the after-
tax wage of secondary earners is higher, and the after-tax wage of primary earners
is lower, compared to the corresponding after-tax wage under joint taxation. As a
consequence, the relative labour supply of secondary earners is higher when house-
hold members report their labour earnings individually rather than jointly. If the
taxation system were to suddenly change from joint to separate taxation, house-
hold would find it optimal to substitute primary earners’ hours with secondary
earners’ hours.
1.3.2 Household tax liabilities and income
The existing taxation system determines the size of total household tax liabilit-
ies, and thus the amount of income available for consumption given primary and
secondary earners’ labour income.
Proposition 2. Let
(
y1, y2
) ∈ R2+ be any pair of primary and secondary earners’
income, with y1 ≥ y2. Then
T joint
(
y1, y2
) ≤ T sep (y1, y2) .
Proof. It follows directly from the convexity of the tax function. See the Appendix
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for more details.
Proposition 2 shows that households can benefit from tax savings when labour
income is filed jointly rather than separately. This is usually known as a joint
tax bonus: assuming that primary and secondary earners’ income under joint and
separate taxation is identical, household tax liabilities under joint taxation are
always less than or equal to tax liabilities under separate taxation. As Figure
1.2a shows, when the tax schedule is progressive, the point on the tax function
that identifies tax liabilities under joint taxation, T joint, always lies below the
corresponding point under separate taxation, T sep, for any given combination of
y1 and y2. The distance between these two points represents the joint tax bonus.
Proposition 2 has also implications for the income available for consumption.
Corollary 1. Let
(
y1, y2
) ∈ R2+ be any pair of primary and secondary earners’
income, with y1 ≥ y2. Then
y1 + y2 − T joint (y1, y2) ≥ y1 + y2 − T sep (y1, y2) .
Proof. If follows immediately from Proposition 2.
Since under joint filing tax liabilities are lower, it follows that household income
left after paying taxes is higher. Therefore, assuming that primary and secondary
earners’ income under joint and separate taxation is identical, household income
available for consumption under joint taxation is always greater than or equal to
income available for consumption under separate taxation.
Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 are useful results that allow us to compare joint
and separate taxation, but ignore the potential labour supply adjustments that a
change in the taxation system is likely to trigger. As discussed in Section 1.3.1,
differences in the marginal tax rates on primary and secondary earners’ income
across taxation systems create an incentive for households to adjust the labour
supply of primary and secondary earners. Consider a hypothetical tax reform
consisting of a switch from joint to single filing: households react to the change
in marginal tax rates by reducing primary earners’ hours to the labour market
and increasing secondary earners’ labour supply. As a result, primary earners’
labour income decreases and secondary earners’ income increases; the net effect
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Figure 1.2: Tax liabilities and income changes
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(c) Different income variation, ∆2 > ∆1
Notes: This figure compares the size of households’ tax liabilities under joint and separate
taxation. Panel (a) shows the relative size of tax liabilities under joint and separate taxation
for any given combination of primary and secondary earners’ income. Panels (b) and (c) show
compare tax liabilities under joint and separate taxation, assuming that income changes when
switching from joint to separate taxation. Panel (b) assumes that primary and secondary earners’
income variations are equal in size but in opposite directions. Panel (c) assumes that secondary
earners’ income increase is larger than primary earners’ income decrease.
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on households’ income, tax liabilities, and income available for consumption is not
clear and ultimately depends on the relative size of the income changes.
For instance, consider the case where the increase in secondary earners’ labour
income is equal to the decrease in primary earners’ income. In such a scenario,
household income available for consumption would fall even though household in-
come before taxes remains constant. This is because tax liabilities increase when
households are filing under the new taxation system.
Figure 1.2b illustrates this case. Since secondary earners’ increase in income,
∆2, is identical to primary earners’ decrease in income, ∆1, household income
before taxes does not change. If households were to file jointly, there would not be
any change in income after taxes because the tax base would be constant, hence tax
liabilities would also be constant. However, under separate taxation tax liabilities
are higher, which implies that household income left for consumption is lower.
Proposition 3 formalises this result.
Proposition 3. Let
(
y1j , y
2
j
) ∈ R2+ be any pair of primary and secondary earners’
income. Let
(
y1s , y
2
s
) ∈ R2+ be another pair of primary and secondary earners’
income such that
y1s = y
1
j −∆1, y2s = y2j + ∆2
with ∆1 and ∆2 both positive. If ∆1 = ∆2, then
y1j + y
2
j − T joint
(
y1j , y
2
j
) ≥ y1s + y2s − T sep (y1s , y2s) .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 tells us that as long as households’ income before taxes does not
change after the tax reform, the switch to separate taxation would be detrimental as
households’ income available for consumption would fall. However, assuming that
the income changes of primary and secondary earners exactly offset each other is
quite restrictive. Since primary and secondary earners have different labour supply
elasticities, one would expect the labour supply adjustments and the size of the
income changes to be different. For instance, one might expect secondary earners
to respond more strongly than primary earners to the changes in the marginal tax
rates, which would imply that secondary earners’ increase in income is larger than
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primary earners’ decrease in income.
Figure 1.2c illustrates this case. Following the tax reform, the increase in
secondary earners’ income is larger than the decrease in primary earners’ income;
thus household income before taxes increases. However, part of the increase in
income is counterbalanced by an increase in tax liabilities under separate taxation,
so the net effect on household income available for consumption remains unclear.
Only if the increase in secondary earners’ income is large enough, would household
income after taxes increase.
Whether household income available for consumption increases after a switch to
separate taxation is ultimately a quantitative question, which depends on a number
of factors including the relative labour supply of primary and secondary earners
before the tax reform, their contribution to household income, their labour sup-
ply elasticity, and other household decisions such as the degree of intra-household
specialisation in home production. Furthermore, a comparative static analysis is
likely to neglect some important inter-temporal aspects of the tax reform, such
as the gradual change in the labour force participation of primary and secondary
earners, and the associated change in the patterns of human capital accumulation.
Finally, a simple framework such as the one used in this section ignores house-
holds’ internal decision making process which must be taken into account if we
are interested in intra-household allocations of resources and household members’
individual well-being.
In the remainder of the paper, a richer model of household behaviour is in-
troduced and simulated to evaluate the effects of a switch from joint to separate
taxation on primary and secondary earners’ labour supply, human capital accumu-
lation, and households’ internal allocation of consumption.
1.4 Model
The economy has three types of agents: households, firms, and a government.
Households supply hours to the labour market and firms aggregate labour inputs
into production. Each period, the wage rate is determined in equilibrium to clear
the labour market. The government collects labour income taxes according to
either a joint or separate taxation system. Households are aware of the existing
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taxation system and honour their tax liabilities accordingly.
1.4.1 Households
Households are composed of two members, a primary earner and a secondary
earner, each with individual characteristics and preferences over consumption and
time allocations.
Household members enjoy consumption of a private good qt and a public good
Qt. A private good is purchased using available income and is allocated to primary
and secondary earners according to a sharing rule that reflects their respective bar-
gaining power. Income available for consumption is obtained by pooling primary
and secondary labour income and subtracting the tax liabilities computed accord-
ing to the current taxation system. A public good is produced internally in the
household using time devoted to home production by both members, denoted by
d1t and d2t . Unlike private goods, public goods are non–rival so both members enjoy
the same amount of public good consumption. Public goods are meant to represent
the outcome of all activities and time investments that take place in the household
or are specific to a married couple. A key aspect is that utility from such activities
is shared and cannot be attributed exclusively to either household member.6
Primary and secondary earners participate in the labour force and earn an
income that is proportional to their hours worked, labour productivity, and a
market wage. When measuring labour supply and potential earnings of primary
and secondary earners, it is useful to think in terms of efficiency units, defined
by hours worked times individual productivity. Individual labour productivity is
proxied by the stock of human capital, denoted by θ1t for primary earners and θ2t
for secondary earners. As a result, given a market wage per efficiency units wt,
primary and secondary earners labour income is wtθ1t h1t and wtθ2t h2t respectively.
The individual stock of human capital evolves endogenously in this model,
with primary and secondary earners’ labour supply decisions affecting it. More
time spent in the labour force adds skills and experience in the workplace thus
increasing the stock of human capital through learning-by-doing. Less time spent
in the labour force makes the stock of human capital depreciate. As a result, the
6Typical examples of such activities and time investments are housework and child care, with
associated public goods being house cleanliness and quality of children.
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stock of human capital of household member m ∈ {1, 2} evolves according to
θmt+1 = (1− δmθ ) θmt + hmt + δmθ θ¯m
where δmθ is a constant depreciation rate and θ¯
m is an intrinsic stock of human
capital.
Households behave according to an inter-temporal version of the collective
household model. Intra-household allocations are the outcome of an internal de-
cision process where households choose present and future variables to reflect the
relative bargaining power of household members. Formally, each household is max-
imising a weighted sum of primary and secondary earners’ individual utility. The
values of the Pareto weights attached to household members’ utility are interpreted
as their bargaining power in the couple and directly affect intra-household alloca-
tions. For instance, a higher Pareto weight on secondary earners’ utility implies a
higher share of consumption, thus a higher individual utility for secondary earners.
The inter-temporal nature of the problem gives rise to commitment issues
within the household. At the time of household formation, a plan that maximises
household utility is set given the Pareto weights on primary and secondary earners’
utility; this plan ensures that every member’s value of staying in the household is
higher than the value of an outside option. However, changes in external factors in
subsequent periods might influence the household in a way that makes the value of
the outside option higher than the value of staying in the household for either the
primary or secondary earner. Whenever this happens, commitment to the original
plan is suboptimal.
In this model, I assume that household members can only partially commit
to future allocations as in Mazzocco (2007). Therefore, a time-consistent optimal
plan has to ensure that at any point in time the value of staying in the household
for either member is at least as great as the value of their best outside option; in
other words, households can only choose plans that satisfy a set of participation
constraints for both household members. The limited commitment assumption is
key to explain variations in the bargaining power. Under perfect commitment,
the relative bargaining power is set at the time of household formation and there
are no future renegotiations between household members. Under limited commit-
ment, any future change in external factors that makes one of the participation
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constraints binding will trigger a renegotiation of intra-household allocations. The
bargaining power of the household member whose participation constraint is bind-
ing will increase to ensure that staying in the household is optimal; this translates
into a larger Pareto weight on individual utility and a larger share of household
resources.
Human capital accumulation and partial commitment to future allocations are
crucial to generate endogenous variations in the bargaining power of household
members. Changes in the stock of human capital of either primary or secondary
earners directly affect the value of their best outside option, given by the value of
divorce in this model. Each period, household members compare the benefits of
staying in the household against divorcing and can decide to leave the household if
it makes them better off. In equilibrium, divorce threats never materialise and the
marriage remains intact: as long as the marriage can create a positive surplus to
be reallocated between household members, there always exists a renegotiation of
consumption and time allocation that makes both household members better off
in the marriage.
The value of the best outside option for primary and secondary earners is
defined as follows. In case of divorce, ex-spouses continue to single life and do not
remarry.7 While divorced, ex-spouses still contribute to the production and enjoy
consumption of a public good, which is meant to capture all activities that survive
the dissolution of marriage, such as child care. When deciding how many hours
to invest in home production, each ex–spouse takes the ex–partner investment in
home production as given.
Ex–spouses participate in the labour force, earn income, and pay taxes accord-
ing to the tax schedule for single households. As the stock of human capital is not
directly affected by divorce events, ex–spouses continue in the labour force with
the same labour productivity as before. In addition to labour income, divorcees
7While not entirely realistic, a no remarriage assumption keeps the model tractable without
sacrificing the results of this paper. Given the inter-temporal nature of the model, the possibility
of remarriage means that current and future utility prospects depend on a larger set of state
variables including the agent’s stock of human capital, expected future marriage surpluses, and
expected bargaining power in the future marriage. On the other hand, a no remarriage assumption
ensures that the value of divorce can be entirely summarised by the stock of human capital. The
difference between these two cases would approximately be a constant shift in the value of divorce
and would not dramatically change how the value of marriage and divorce variate after the tax
reform, which is key for changes in bargaining power in the marriage.
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that were secondary earners in the household receive spousal maintenance from
their ex–partner. Spousal maintenance takes the form of a constant transfer tr
from ex–primary earners to ex–secondary earners.8
Formally, the value of the outside option for primary earners in period t is
defined by
V 1D(θ
1
t ) ≡ max{x1τ}∞τ=t
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tu1(Qτ , q1τ , h
1
τ , d
1
τ )
s.t. q1τ + T
single(wτθ
1
τh
1
τ ) = wτθ
1
τh
1
τ − tr
θ1τ+1 = (1− δ1θ)θ1τ + h1τ + δ1θθ1
Qτ = AQ(d
1
τ )
δ1(d2τ )
δ2
and the value of the outside option for secondary earners by
V 2D(θ
2
t ) ≡ max{x2τ}∞τ=t
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tu2(Qτ , q2τ , h
2
τ , d
2
τ )
s.t. q2τ + T
single(wτθ
2
τh
2
τ ) = wτθ
2
τh
2
τ + tr
θ2τ+1 = (1− δ2θ)θ2τ + h2τ + δ2θθ2
Qτ = AQ(d
1
τ )
δ1(d2τ )
δ2
where xm ≡ (Q, qm, hm, dm, θm) is the set of choice variables for household member
m ∈ {1, 2} and T single(·) is the tax schedule for single households.
Notice that the value of divorce in any period t is a function of the stock
of human capital θmt , which entirely summarises the labour market conditions of
member m at the time of divorce. As I argue in the next section, a change in the
taxation system that improves labour market conditions for secondary earners will
increase the value of their outside option and make the participation constraint
more likely to bind. Whenever the participation constraint binds, a renegotiation
of intra-household allocations that benefits secondary earners occurs.
Finally, denote by µ1 the Pareto weight on primary earners’ utility, µ2 the
8In most countries, spousal maintenance is awarded to ex–spouses with a lower earning capa-
city after the dissolution of a marriage. Moreover, these payments are computed independently
of child support payments.
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Pareto weight on secondary earners’ utility, and x ≡ (Q, q1, q2, h1, h2, d1, d2, θ1, θ2)
the set of choice variables for the household. Households choose intra-household
allocations to solve the following problem
max
{xt}∞t=1
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
{
µ1u1
(
Qt, q
1
t , h
1
t , d
1
t
)
+ µ2u2
(
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2
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2
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2
t
)}
s.t. q1t + q
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where the last two inequalities in the set of constraints represent the participation
constraints, which ensure that in any period both household members are better
off in the marriage. T (·, ·) is the tax schedule for households, which maps primary
and secondary earners’ labour earnings into household tax liabilities according to
the existing tax system, either joint or separate taxation.
1.4.2 Firms and labour market
Firms combine labour inputs of primary and secondary earners into production
according to the following production technology
Yt = AY (Ht)
α
where Ht is total labour input and AY is total factor productivity.
Total labour input Ht is measured in efficiency units. Since primary and sec-
ondary earners time and experience in the labour force differs, so does their output
contribution per hour worked. Each worker’s effective contribution to production is
given by their hours worked augmented by their individual productivity. Assuming
that the individual stock of human capital θt is a proxy for individual productivity,
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each worker’s efficiency units of labour are given by θtht.
The labour market structure is standard. Firms demand labour and workers
supply hours at the prevailing market wage. Aggregate labour supply is the sum
of primary and secondary earners’ contribution to the labour market, that is
HSt =
1
2
θ1t h
1
t +
1
2
θ2t h
2
t .
Aggregate labour demand is given by firms’ optimality condition
αAY
(
HDt
)α−1
= wt
where the wage per efficiency unit wt is endogenously determined by market clear-
ing,
Ht = H
S
t = H
D
t .
1.4.3 Parameters and functional forms
Household members’ preferences over consumption and leisure are described by the
following utility function
um (Q, qm, hm, dm) = γm logQ+
(qm)1−σ
m − 1
1− σm − φ
m (h
m + dm)1+
1/ηm
1 + 1/ηm
which is additively separable in consumption of both goods and time devoted to
either labour or home production. Parameters are household member-specific and
described as follows: γm controls the preference for public good consumption over
private good consumption, σm is the relative risk aversion, φm controls the disutil-
ity from hours worked, and ηm is the Frisch elasticity of labour supply.
Home production is described by a Cobb-Douglas technology that combines
time inputs from primary and secondary earners to produce a public good
Q(d1, d2) = AQ
(
d1
)δ1 (d2)δ2
where δ1 and δ2 control the marginal productivity of primary and secondary earners
in home production.
Parameter values are reported in Table 1.1. All primary and secondary earner-
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specific parameters are symmetric except for the Frisch elasticity of labour sup-
ply. According to Peterman (2015), primary earners’ elasticity of labour supply is
lower than secondary earners’ elasticity of labour supply; therefore, I set primary
earners’ elasticity to be half of that of secondary earners. According to Blundell
et al. (2016), a value of 0.5 for secondary earners’ labour supply elasticity is within
the estimates obtained with a labour supply model that takes human capital ac-
cumulation into account. This asymmetry in labour supply elasticities is sufficient
to generate a steady state where primary earners supply more hours to the labour
market and have a higher stock of human capital than secondary earners.
Primary and secondary earners’ productivity in home production is identical,
δ1 = δ2, and home production displays constant returns to scale. AQ controls
the overall home production productivity in the marriage, whereas AQ controls
productivity in the case of divorce. Everything else being held constant, it is
reasonable to expect a married couple to be more productive than a divorced or
separated couple. For instance, one could think that coordination problems might
arise when a couple is divorced which would make the production of public goods
less efficient. Therefore, I normalise AQ to one and set AQ = 0.85.
The Pareto weight on primary earners’ utility is normalised to one, whereas the
initial Pareto weight on secondary earners’ utility is set to 0.92. Therefore, sec-
ondary earners start with a lower relative bargaining power than primary earners.
More details on the initial distribution of bargaining power and its implications for
the evolution of primary and secondary earners’ private consumption are given in
Section 1.6.1.
The model introduced in the previous section allows for spousal maintenance
payments in the case of divorce. Spousal maintenance (alimony) payments are
transfers ruled by a court or agreed between ex-spouses that benefit divorcees with a
lower earning capacity. Spousal maintenance is regulated by family laws concerning
marriage dissolution and divorce settlements. In most countries—e.g. US, UK,
Germany, and Italy—there is not a fixed formula to decide the amount and duration
of payments, thus family judges make a decision based on a number of factors that
consider ex-spouses’ earning capacity and investments in the household.9 As a
9Several factors are considered. First, the current and expected future income and earning
capacity of divorcees. Secondly, the contribution which each divorcee has made or is expected to
make to the welfare of the family, including looking after the family home and children. Thirdly,
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Table 1.1: Model parameters
Description Parameter Value
Primary earner
Preference for public good γ1 1
Relative risk aversion σ1 1
Labour disutility φ1 4
Frisch elasticity of labour supply η1 0.25
Depreciation rate of human capital δ1θ 0.2
Intrinsic human capital θ¯1 5
Home production productivity δ1 0.5
Initial Pareto weight µ1 1
Secondary earner
Preference for public good γ2 1
Relative risk aversion σ2 1
Labour disutility φ2 4
Frisch elasticity of labour supply η2 0.5
Depreciation rate of human capital δ2θ 0.2
Intrinsic human capital θ¯2 5
Home production productivity δ2 0.5
Initial Pareto weight µ2 0.92
Households
Discount factor β 0.96
Home production productivity (marriage) AQ 1
Home production productivity (divorce) AQ 0.85
Spousal maintenance tr 0.55
Firms
Total factor productivity AY 2.23
Labour share α 2/3
Notes: Model parameterisation and calibration. Please refer to main text.
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result, the correct size of spousal maintenance payments can be hard to pin down;
here I choose tr to be 0.55, which corresponds to 15 percent of ex-primary earners
disposable income in the outside option steady state.
Firms’ total factor productivity is calibrated to target a wage per efficiency units
equal to one in the steady state under joint taxation. This wage normalisation
allows me to easily interpret the labour market effects of the change in the tax
system from joint to separate taxation.
When comparing household labour supply under joint and separate taxation
systems, a progressive tax schedule is necessary to generate different marginal tax
rates on primary and secondary earners’ income. Therefore, the tax function T
that maps primary and secondary earners’ labour income into household tax liab-
ilities should be flexible enough to reproduce some degree of progressivity. Under
joint taxation, the relevant tax base is computed according to the income splitting
method, thus household tax liabilities are given by
T joint
(
y1, y2
)
= 2T
(
y1 + y2
2
)
where y1 and y2 are primary and secondary earners’ labour income. Under separate
taxation, household tax liabilities are the sum of primary and secondary earners’
individual tax liabilities, that is
T sep
(
y1, y2
)
= T (y1)+ T (y2) .
In the outside option problem, the tax schedule for single households is given
by the tax function T itself, that is T single (y) = T (y).
Table 1.2 reports different tax function specifications used in this paper. Func-
tional forms and parameters values are taken from Guner et al. (2014) who estimate
tax functions and the associated degree of progressivity using U.S. micro-data. The
quantitative analysis in the next section uses the power specification as a baseline.
Nevertheless, results are robust to other specifications.
investments made during the marriage that have generated needs on the part of the financially
weaker party, such as sacrificing careers prospects to dedicate time to children or other household-
specific investments. Lastly, the marital standard of living before the dissolution of marriage.
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Table 1.2: Tax function specifications
Functional form Parameter Value
Power specification
T (y) = y (δ + γy)
δ -0.089
γ 0.186
 0.236
HSV specification
T (y) = y (1− λy−τ ) λ 0.902
τ 0.036
Log specification
T (y) = y (α+ β log y) α 0.099
β 0.035
Notes: Tax functions used to compute household tax liabilities as a func-
tion of primary and secondary earners’ income. In the joint filing case,
household tax burden is given by 2T (y) where y = (y1 + y2) /2. In the
single filing case, household tax burden is given by T (y1)+T (y2). Func-
tional forms and parameter values are taken from Guner et al. (2014).
1.5 Joint versus separate taxation: steady states and
transition
In this section, I document the effects of a switch from joint to separate taxa-
tion on labour supply, human capital formation, and intra-household allocations
of consumption. The economy is assumed to be at its steady state in the period
before the tax reform and the change in the taxation system is unanticipated by
households. At the time of the tax reform, households receive news that primary
and secondary earners have to file their income individually, and thus they revise
their labour supply and consumption plans accordingly. As shown in Section 1.3, a
change in the taxation system from joint to single filing modifies the marginal tax
rates on primary and secondary earners’ income. In a simple static model, house-
hold members adjust their labour supply to reflect the more (or less) favourable tax
rate with secondary earners increasing labour supply and primary earners decreas-
ing theirs. In a dynamic model, the same labour supply adjustments have a direct
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impact on the human capital accumulation of primary and secondary earners, and
thus on the value of marriage and divorce.
Higher labour supply and improved labour market conditions for secondary
earners imply a higher share of their income over household total income. However,
a larger contribution to household resources does not automatically translate into
higher well-being for secondary earners as intra-household allocations of consump-
tion depend on their bargaining power. In households where secondary earners’
relative bargaining power is low, most of the benefits will be reaped by primary
earners since their share in consumption of private good is higher. Therefore, sec-
ondary earners’ decrease in leisure is less than compensated for by an increase
in private consumption, which ultimately results into a lower individual utility in
the household. Conversely, better labour market conditions for secondary earners
directly improve the value of their outside option since in the case of divorce they
will be able convert higher labour income into more consumption.
The aim of this section is to show that variations in the value of marriage
and divorce caused by the tax reform can trigger an internal redistribution of
private consumption from primary to secondary earners in households where the
bargaining power of secondary earner is low. If the increase in secondary earners’
human capital is such that the value of divorce exceeds the value of marriage,
the participation constraint of the household problem is binding. As a result,
the Pareto weight on secondary earners’ individual utility increases to guarantee
that the participation constraint is not violated; that is, the household revises
allocations of consumption to ensure that the value of staying in the marriage for
secondary earners is at least as great as the value of divorce.
The limited commitment assumption is crucial to explain variations in the bar-
gaining power of secondary earners. To emphasise the role of limited commitment,
the quantitative analysis in this section reports the main results along with the
full commitment case. Firstly, the steady state of endogenous variables is com-
puted under joint and separate taxation. Then, the transition from the steady
state under joint taxation to the steady state under separate taxation is shown
and commented. The Pareto weight on primary earners’ utility µ1 is normalised
to 1, and the initial Pareto weight on secondary earners’ utility µ2 is set to 0.92.
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Table 1.3: Labour income and taxes
Description Variable Joint tax Separate tax
Labour income
Primary earner income y1 4.4149 4.0057
Secondary earner income y2 2.1544 2.6271
Secondary earner share (%) y2/y 32.80 39.61
Household income y 6.5693 6.6328
Household income after taxes ynet 5.5362 5.5756
Taxes
Primary earner marg. tax rate (%) T1 21.54 23.00
Secondary earner marg. tax rate (%) T2 21.54 19.98
Household tax liabilities T 1.0331 1.0572
Notes: Steady state of endogenous variables under joint and separate taxation.
1.5.1 Taxes, labour supply, and human capital
Table 1.3 reports the steady state values of labour income, marginal tax rates,
and household tax liabilities under joint and separate taxation. Compared to joint
taxation, under separate taxation primary earners’ labour income is lower and
secondary earners’ labour income is higher. The steady state value of primary
earners’ labour income decreases from 4.41 to 4.01 when the economy reaches its
new steady state under separate taxation. Conversely, the steady state value of
secondary earners’ labour income increases from 2.15 to 2.63.
Households’ labour income, defined as the sum of primary and secondary
earners’ labour income, increases after the tax reform. This is because the de-
crease in primary earners’ income is more than counterbalanced by the increase in
secondary earners’ income. Moreover, the tax reform modifies the internal distribu-
tion of income in the household. Under joint taxation, secondary earners’ share of
labour income over household income is 32.8 percent, while under separate taxation
it is almost 40 percent.
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Table 1.4: Time allocations and human capital
Description Variable Joint tax Separate tax
Labour supply
Primary earner labour supply h1 0.5644 0.5271
Secondary earner labour supply h2 0.3252 0.3820
Home production
Primary earner time to home prod. d1 0.3473 0.3706
Secondary earner time to home prod. d2 0.4426 0.4123
Human capital
Primary earner human capital θ1 7.8221 7.6357
Secondary earner human capital θ2 6.6258 6.9101
Notes: Steady state of endogenous variables under joint and separate taxation.
As a result of the increase in households’ income, the steady state value of
households’ tax liabilities under separate taxation is higher than its steady state
value under joint taxation. Nevertheless, households’ income after taxes increases
from 5.54 to 5.58 which means that households have access to more consumption
of private goods under separate taxation.
Marginal tax rates on household members’ labour income are a direct function
of the tax system in place. Under joint taxation, the relevant tax base is either
household’s income or a measure that takes into account both household members’
income, e.g. an average of primary and secondary earners’ income. Hence, marginal
tax rates on primary and secondary earners’ income are identical, regardless of the
internal distribution of income. Under separate taxation, each household member
reports her own income individually. The progressivity of the tax schedule, along
with a gap in primary and secondary earners’ income, creates two different marginal
tax rates.
When the taxation system switches from joint to separate taxation, the mar-
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ginal tax rate on primary earners’ labour income increases and the marginal tax
rate on secondary earners’ labour income is reduced. In the steady state under joint
taxation, the marginal tax rate on both primary and secondary earners’ income is
21.54 percent. In the steady state under separate taxation, the marginal tax rate
on primary earners’ income is 23 percent and the marginal tax rate on secondary
earners’ income is 20 percent. A higher marginal tax rate implies that primary
earners’ after–tax wage is lower under the new taxation system. Conversely, a
lower marginal tax rate implies that secondary earners’ after–tax wage is higher.
Changes in the marginal tax rates and after–tax wages drive the labour supply
adjustment and reallocation of time devoted to home production within house-
holds. Table 1.4 reports the steady state values of labour supply, time devoted
to home production, and human capital for primary and secondary earners under
joint and separate taxation. Due to the change in relative wages, primary and
secondary earners adjust their labour supply and time to home production in op-
posite directions. Primary earners reduce their labour supply and increase their
time devoted to home production, whereas secondary earners increase their labour
supply and reduce their time devoted to home production. Comparing the steady
states under joint and separate taxation, primary earners’ labour supply decreases
from 0.56 to 0.53, and time spent in home production increases from 0.35 to 0.37.
Secondary earners’ labour supply increases from 0.33 to 0.38, and time spent in
home production decreases from 0.44 to 0.41.
Labour supply adjustments induced by the tax reform change the patterns of
human capital formation for primary and secondary earners. Following the switch
from joint to separate taxation, the steady state of primary earners’ stock of human
capital decreases from 7.82 to 7.64, while the steady state of secondary earners’
stock of human capital increases from 6.63 to 6.91. The transition to the new
stock of human capital is not immediate. As Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 suggest,
labour supply and human capital of primary and secondary earners slowly adjust
to reach their new steady state values. Immediately after the tax reform, changes
in the marginal tax rates create an incentive for secondary earners to supply more
hours and primary earners to reduce their labour supply. As secondary earners
increase their effort in the workplace, they accumulate additional skills which ulti-
mately raise their nominal wage. This effect creates a positive feedback loop where
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Figure 1.3: Primary earners’ labour supply and human capital transition
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Notes: This figure shows the evolution of labour supply and stock of human capital of primary
earners immediately after the tax reform. Labour supply is indicated by a dashed line with
associated values on the left axis. Human capital is indicated by a solid line with associated
values on the right axis.
increased wages boost labour supply, and increased labour supply contributes to
human capital accumulation. A similar but opposite argument applies to primary
earners; as primary earners gradually reduce their labour supply, their stock of
human capital deteriorates.
At the same time, primary and secondary earners adjust their time devoted
to home production. As Figure 1.5 shows, secondary earners’ investment in home
production is gradually reduced as they put more effort in the labour market.
Secondary earners’ dis-investment is counterbalanced by an increase in time spent
in home production by primary earners. Overall, the net effect is that households’
internal production of public goods is virtually unchanged.
1.5.2 Bargaining power and consumption
Intra-household allocations of private good consumption depend on the relative
bargaining power of primary and secondary earners in the household. In the model,
household members’ bargaining power is determined endogenously by the relative
size of the Pareto weights on primary and secondary earners’ individual utilities.
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Figure 1.4: Secondary earners’ labour supply and human capital transition
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Notes: This figure shows the evolution of labour supply and stock of human capital of secondary
earners immediately after the tax reform. Labour supply is indicated by a dashed line with
associated values on the left axis. Human capital is indicated by a solid line with associated
values on the right axis.
In each period, primary and secondary earners’ value of staying in the household
(marriage) is compared to the value of their outside option (divorce), and the Pareto
weights change or remain constant based on this information. Given the relative
movements in the stock of human capital of primary and secondary earners after
the tax reform, the value of their outside option changes accordingly which could
create endogenous variations in the Pareto weights. In what follows, I show that
secondary earners’ Pareto weight changes after the tax reform, and its implications
for intra-household allocations of private good consumption. First, I document the
steady state of household consumption under joint and separate taxation. Then, I
explain how the model is able to generate an internal reallocation of private good
consumption between household members.
Table 1.5 reports the steady state of household members’ private and pub-
lic good consumption under joint and separate taxation. To highlight the role of
bargaining, steady state values are reported for two alternative scenarios: full com-
mitment and limited commitment. Under full commitment, the Pareto weights on
household members’ utility are fixed at their initial level. Under limited commit-
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Figure 1.5: Time devoted to home production transition
(a) Primary earners
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Notes: This figure shows the evolution of time devoted to home production immediately after
the tax reform. Panel (a) shows primary earners’ time to home production. Panel (b) shows
secondary earners’ time to home production.
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ment, the Pareto weights are allowed to change endogenously in order to ensure
that the participation constraints are satisfied.
Under both scenarios, the consumption of private good increases for both
primary and secondary earners when the tax system changes from joint to sep-
arate taxation. Since the tax reform increases households’ net income, households
members have access to more consumption of private good in the steady state un-
der separate taxation compared to joint taxation. However, the intra-household
distribution of consumption differs depending on the scenario considered.
Under full commitment, the tax reform has no effect on the relative bargaining
power of household members. Therefore, secondary earners’ share of private con-
sumption over total private consumption is constant despite the increase in their
share of income over household income. Under limited commitment, the Pareto
weight on secondary earners’ utility increases to 0.9253 in the steady state under
separate taxation, whereas the Pareto weight on primary earners’ utility remains
constant. The increase in secondary earners’ bargaining power causes a redis-
tribution of private good consumption from primary to secondary earners; that
is, secondary earners’ share of private good consumption over total private good
consumption increases from 47.92 to 48.06 percentage points.
The endogenous variation in the bargaining power of secondary earners is en-
tirely determined by the relative changes in the value of marriage and divorce along
the transition from the steady state under joint taxation to the steady state under
separate taxation. When the taxation system changes from joint to single filing,
secondary earners incrementally increase their labour supply, which makes their
stock of human capital increase as a consequence of more experience in the labour
force. The gradual increase in the labour supply and human capital of second-
ary earners causes movements in their value of marriage as well as their value of
divorce. On the one hand, the value of marriage is decreasing as the increase in la-
bour supply is not adequately compensated by an increase in private consumption.
On the other hand, the value of divorce is increasing as a result of better labour
market conditions for secondary earners, i.e. a higher human capital.
As Figure 1.6 shows, the continued reduction in the value of marriage along
with the increase in the value of divorce makes the participation constraint of
the household problem binding. Household members have to renegotiate intra-
1.5 Joint versus separate taxation: steady states and transition 34
Figure 1.6: Secondary earners’ values and bargaining power
(a) Secondary earners’ value of marriage
(
V 2M
)
and divorce
(
V 2D
)
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(b) Secondary earners’ Pareto weight
(
µ2
)
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0.923
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Notes: This figure shows the evolution of secondary earners’ value and bargaining power after
the tax reform. Panel (a) compares the value of staying in the household (marriage) to the value
of the best outside option (divorce) for secondary earners. Panel (b) shows the variation in the
Pareto weight on secondary earners’ utility.
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Figure 1.7: Primary earners’ values and bargaining power
(a) Primary earners’ value of marriage
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)
and divorce
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(b) Primary earners’ Pareto weight
(
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Notes: This figure shows the evolution of primary earners’ value and bargaining power after the
tax reform. Panel (a) compares the value of staying in the household (marriage) to the value of
the best outside option (divorce) for primary earners. Panel (b) shows the variation in the Pareto
weight on primary earners’ utility.
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household allocations in order to ensure that the value of marriage is at least as
great as the value of divorce, and thus the participation constraint is satisfied. This
is achieved by gradually increasing the Pareto weight on secondary earners’ utility.
As the Pareto weight increases, secondary earners gain more bargaining power
in the marriage, which ultimately translates into an increased share of secondary
earners’ private good consumption over household private good consumption.
Figure 1.7 shows the transition of primary earners’ value of marriage and di-
vorce, as well as the Pareto weight on primary earners’ utility. After the tax reform,
primary earners’ value of marriage initially increases and subsequently falls to sta-
bilise at its new steady state.10 At the same time, the depreciation of primary
earners’ human capital is responsible for the fall in the value of divorce. Since
the value of marriage is always larger than the value of divorce, the participation
constraint for primary earners is always satisfied, and their Pareto weight remains
constant along the transition.
The shift in relative bargaining power creates interesting dynamics of private
good consumption. Figure 1.8 compares the transition of private good consumption
under limited commitment to the transition under full commitment. After the tax
reform, both primary and secondary earners’ private consumption increase due to
an increase in household labour income. Around sixteen periods after the switch
to separate taxation, the sudden increase in secondary earners’ bargaining power
changes the trajectories of private good consumption. While primary earners’
private good consumption starts to fall, secondary earners’ private consumption
increases at a faster rate. As a consequence, secondary earners enjoy a higher
share of private good consumption in the household.
Figure 1.9 compares the dynamics of household’s value and household members’
value of marriage under limited commitment and full commitment. Household’s
value is computed as the sum of primary and secondary earners’ value in the
marriage. Under limited commitment, the Pareto weights are allowed to vary
endogenously. Under full commitment, the Pareto weights are fixed at their initial
values. Households members’ value of marriage display a reverse pattern. While
primary earners are better off in the full commitment scenario, secondary earners
10The fall in primary earners’ value of marriage is due to the reallocation of private good
consumption from primary earners to secondary earners.
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Figure 1.8: Private good consumption dynamics
(a) Primary earners’ private good consumption
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(b) Secondary earners’ private good consumption
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Notes: This figure shows the evolution of private consumption after the tax reform under full
commitment and limited commitment. Panel (a) shows primary earners’ private good consump-
tion. Panel (b) shows secondary earners’ private good consumption. Panel (c) shows the share
of secondary earners’ private good consumption over household private good consumption.
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Figure 1.9: Household’s value and household members’ value of marriage
(a) Household’s value
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Notes: This figure compares the evolution of household’s value and household members’ value of
marriage under full commitment and limited commitment. Household’s value is computed as the
sum of household members’ values. Panel (a) shows the value for the household. Panel (b) shows
the value of marriage for primary earners. Panel (c) shows the value of marriage for secondary
earners.
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are better off in the limited commitment scenario. Under limited commitment,
the transition to separate taxation is able to create a redistribution of private
consumption from primary to secondary earners; hence, under limited commitment
primary earners enjoy relatively less consumption, whereas secondary earners enjoy
more.
After the tax reform, household’s value remains roughly constant in both full
commitment and limited commitment scenarios. Notice that compared to the full
commitment case, under limited commitment household’s value is higher, even
though this difference seems to be small. Since secondary earners start from a
lower level of consumption, their marginal utility from private consumption is
higher than primary earners’ marginal utility. Therefore, any redistribution of
consumption from primary to secondary earners translates into a higher welfare at
a household level.
1.6 Sensitivity analysis
1.6.1 Initial bargaining power and gains from marriage
Household decisions on labour supply and intra-household allocations of consump-
tion depend on the relative bargaining power of primary and secondary earners in
the household. As shown in the previous section, any variation in the bargaining
power depends on the endogenous variation of the gains from marriage of each
household member, defined as the difference between the value of staying in the
household and the value of the outside option. Therefore, the gains from marriage
and the relative bargaining power of household members are key quantities in the
model. On the one hand, the size of the gains from marriage determines whether
primary and secondary earners’ relative bargaining power endogenously responds
to changes in external factors.11 On the other hand, the initial bargaining power
determines primary and secondary earners’ initial share of the marriage surplus.
Household members with higher (lower) bargaining power enjoy a larger (smaller)
11For instance, household members that enjoy large gains from marriage are less likely to see
their bargaining power change as their participation constraint is less likely to bind. Conversely,
household members that enjoy small gains from marriage are more likely to experience an increase
in their bargaining power as their participation constraint is more likely to bind.
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share of the marriage surplus. As a result, the initial bargaining power matters for
the evolution of bargaining power after the tax reform.
In the previous section, I assumed a Pareto weight on secondary earners’ utility
equal to 0.92 and normalised the Pareto weight on primary earners’ utility to one;
then I showed that secondary earners’ bargaining power increases along the trans-
ition from joint to separate taxation. In this section, I show how the evolution of
primary and secondary earners’ bargaining power and gains from marriage changes
with the initial choice of Pareto weights.
Table 1.6 reports the steady state values of secondary earners’ share of private
good consumption and gains from marriage for different initial values of Pareto
weights. As before, the Pareto weight on primary earners’ utility is normalised to
one, which means that primary and secondary earners’ initial bargaining power is
uniquely identified by choosing the Pareto weight on secondary earners’ utility.12
For each value of secondary earners’ Pareto weight, Table 1.6 reports the steady
state under joint (pre-reform) and separate taxation (post-reform).
As expected, lower values of the Pareto weight are associated with lower gains
from marriage for secondary earners. Since the ratio of the Pareto weights con-
trols the private good consumption sharing rule, lower values of secondary earners’
Pareto weight imply a lower share of their private good consumption over house-
holds’ private good consumption. As a result, secondary earners have access to a
lower share of households’ resources, and thus lower gains from marriage. Under
joint taxation, any initial Pareto weight higher than 0.88 is such that the gains from
marriage for secondary earners are positive. Conversely, any initial Pareto weight
lower than or equal to 0.88 implies that secondary earners’ gains from marriage
are negative, and their participation constraint is not satisfied.
The tax reform influences secondary earners’ gains from marriage and share of
private consumption differently depending on the initial bargaining power. For all
12The choice of secondary earners’ initial Pareto weight is arbitrary. The model introduced in
Section 1.4 assumes that households are already formed, and it lacks a marriage market where
individuals meet and decide to marry; therefore, the initial bargaining power of married couples
is not endogenously determined as a function of individuals’ characteristics and is taken as given.
This assumption allows me to investigate the behaviour of households whose Pareto weights are off
the equilibrium outcome of the marriage market, and to focus on married couples whose relative
bargaining power has evolved over time due to exogenous factors which are hard to model or to
identify in the data.
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initial Pareto weights, the gains from marriage are smaller in the steady state under
separate taxation.13 This is because under the new tax system, secondary earners
have a higher stock of human capital and enjoy better labour market conditions. As
a result, the value of their outside option increases, making the prospect of staying
in the household less appealing. However, an internal redistribution of private
consumption only occurs if the initial Pareto weight is 0.92 or lower. If secondary
earners’ bargaining power is low enough, secondary earners’ gains from marriage
gradually decrease to an extent which makes the participation constraint binding.
When this happens, household members renegotiate intra-household allocations of
private consumption to ensure that secondary earners are at least as better off as in
their outside option. As a result, secondary earners’ share of private consumption
increases in the steady state under separate taxation.
The timing of the internal renegotiation depends on the initial bargaining power
as well. Secondary earners with a lower bargaining power enjoy a smaller share of
marital surplus; therefore, their gains from marriage erode more quickly as their
value of divorce increases. For instance, with an initial Pareto weight of 0.91 the
participation constraint starts to bind eight periods after the tax reform, and with
an initial Pareto weight of 0.89 the participation constraint starts to bind after two
periods only.14
1.6.2 Labour market and aggregate effects
This section focuses on the labour market effects generated by the tax reform. In
particular, I investigate whether the change in taxation system is able to generate
movements in aggregate quantities and equilibrium wages. To identify any aggreg-
ate effect, I compare the steady state of the full model to the steady state of a
restricted version of the model without a labour market. In the restricted version
of the model—which I refer to as partial equilibrium model—I assume that the
wage per efficiency unit does not respond to aggregate labour supply variations
13The only exception being the case where µ2 = 0.88. In this case, the participation constraint
is violated immediately and the gains from marriage are set to zero to enforce secondary earners’
participation in the marriage.
14Figures showing the transition of secondary earners’ value of marriage, value of divorce, and
bargaining power can be found in the Appendix.
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Table 1.7: Labour market and aggregate effects
Description Variable Joint tax
Separate tax
full model partial eq.
Aggregate quantities
Aggregate labour supply H 3.2846 3.3324 3.3321
Wage per efficiency unit w 1 0.9952 1
Labour supply and human capital
Primary earner labour supply h1 0.5644 0.5271 0.5271
Primary earner human capital θ1 7.8221 7.6357 7.6355
Secondary earner labour supply h2 0.3252 0.3820 0.3820
Secondary earner human capital θ2 6.6258 6.9101 6.9099
Income and consumption
Households income y 6.5693 6.6328 6.6641
Taxes T 1.0331 1.0572 1.0640
Household consumption q 5.5362 5.5756 5.6001
Notes: Steady state of endogenous variables under joint and separate taxation. Values are
reported for the full model and the restricted model (partial equilibrium). The full model
is calibrated to ensure that the equilibrium wage per efficiency unit is equal to one in the
steady state under joint taxation. Therefore, full and partial equilibrium model coincide
under joint taxation.
and remains constant throughout the transition to the new steady state.15 In the
restricted model, I normalise the wage per efficiency unit to one. In the full model,
I calibrate firms’ total factor productivity to target a wage per efficiency unit equal
to one in the steady state under joint taxation. As a result, both restricted and
full model have an identical steady state under joint taxation.
Table 1.7 reports the steady state before and after the tax reform. As previ-
ously discussed, the switch to a separate taxation system creates a substitution
15Formally, the partial equilibrium model is defined by households’ optimality conditions only.
Firms’ optimality conditions and market clearing are omitted. The wage per efficiency unit is a
constant parameter.
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effect where secondary earners increase their labour supply and primary earners
reduce theirs. Similarly, secondary earners’ human capital increases and primary
earners’ human capital is reduced. Overall, aggregate labour supply—measured
in efficiency units—slightly increases in the steady state under separate taxation,
which pushes the equilibrium wage downwards. Nevertheless, the movement in the
wage per efficiency unit is very small, and households’ labour supply response to
such change is barely noticeable if not absent. That is, primary and secondary
earners’ labour supply and human capital in the full model are almost identical to
their counterparts in the partial equilibrium model. Some difference is present in
households’ income; due to a reduction in the wage per efficiency unit, households’
income before and after taxes is slightly lower in the full model compared to the
partial equilibrium model.
1.7 Conclusions
Joint and separate taxation systems differ in two key aspects. First, there exists
a tax bonus for married couples when income is filed jointly; that is, the tax
liabilities of married individuals under joint taxation are lower than their combined
liabilities under separate taxation. Secondly, the marginal tax rate on primary and
secondary earners’ income differs across taxation systems, with secondary earners’
marginal tax rate being higher under joint taxation. Recent literature has shown
that these differences in household tax treatment matter for labour supply decisions
of primary and secondary earners. Nevertheless, the implications for households’
internal decision making process and allocation of consumption between primary
and secondary earners have been for the most part unexplored.
This paper documents households’ labour supply, patterns of human capital
formation, and changes in intra-household allocations of consumption along the
transition from joint to separate taxation. Household behaviour is described by an
inter-temporal version of the collective household model, where the relative bar-
gaining power of primary and secondary earners determines intra-household alloc-
ations of consumption and time. Household members can only partially commit to
present and future allocations, which means that previously agreed allocations are
occasionally renegotiated when the relative bargaining power of household mem-
1.7 Conclusions 45
bers shifts.
The quantitative exercise in this paper shows that the tax reform causes an in-
ternal redistribution of consumption from primary to secondary earners in house-
holds where the bargaining power of secondary earners is low. The size of the
redistribution depends on the initial bargaining power of household members; the
lower the bargaining power of secondary earners, the higher the magnitude of the
redistribution. When the tax system changes from joint to single filing, the mar-
ginal tax rate on secondary earners’ income is reduced. A lower marginal tax rate
creates an incentive for secondary earners to increase their labour force participa-
tion, with a positive effect on their human capital and value of divorce. Along the
transition from joint to separate taxation, the gradual increase in the value of the
outside option makes secondary earners’ participation constraint binding, which
causes their Pareto weight to increase. A higher bargaining power translates into
a higher share of secondary earners’ private good consumption in the household.
Chapter 2
Loose Commitment in a Sticky
Wages New Keynesian model
2.1 Introduction
Since the seminal contribution of Kydland and Prescott (1977), the macroeco-
nomic literature has been aware that optimal policy plans are subject to time
inconsistency. In a model with rational forward-looking agents, the optimal policy
prescribes that the policymaker should manage expectations of future outcomes by
promising to deliver when the time comes. Nevertheless, honouring past promises
becomes sub-optimal from the perspective of a future policymaker, hence the time
inconsistency of the originally formulated policy plan.
In order to address this issue, the literature has focused on two main models
of central bank behaviour: commitment and discretion. Under commitment, the
policymaker has access to a commitment technology that allows her to fully deliver
on past promises at any point in the future, therefore escaping the time inconsist-
ency problem. The temptation to renege is still present but the planner is unable
to deviate from previously announced plans. On the contrary, under discretion the
policy maker has the flexibility to disregard any past promises and change her ac-
tions depending on current circumstances. Discretion is therefore time-consistent
by construction.
Despite the valuable insights produced using either framework, both modes of
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policymaker behaviour contrasts with some stylised facts. For instance, members
of the monetary policy committee change over time as do the laws that control
the behaviour of monetary policy, which suggests that new strategies are refor-
mulated occasionally. On the other hand, central banks actively try to influence
expectations through policy statements and forward guidance.
In this paper I consider a monetary policy setting that lies in between the limit-
ing cases of full commitment and discretion. This is known in the literature as loose
commitment or quasi commitment. Under loose commitment, the policymaker can
credibly commit to an announced policy plan and honour past promises; however,
with an exogenous probability she will be given the chance to reoptimise and an-
nounce a new plan. Given that this is optimal, she will do so. This probability of
commitment is common knowledge to the rational agents in the model which will
internalise this information when forming expectations. As a result, the credibility
of the monetary authority is imperfect.
Given the described framework, I study the optimal monetary policy under
imperfect credibility in a baseline New Keynesian model with both sticky prices
and wages. The presence of wage stickiness adds another friction to model where
wage dispersion reduces welfare. As a consequence, wage inflation stabilisation
is one of the central bank objectives on top of output gap and price inflation
stabilisation.
The loose commitment paradigm allows me to investigate interesting normative
and positive aspects of monetary policy and credibility. On the normative side, the
relationship between credibility and welfare can be studied and the welfare gains
from increasing commitment can be measured. On the positive side, solving the
optimal policy under loose commitment allows me to evaluate the transmission of
monetary policy under different credibility levels and the associated business cycle
properties.
This paper is related to the literature on optimal monetary policy and loose
commitment settings. Optimal monetary policy design and formalisation of the
planner problem follows the seminal work of Clarida et al. (1999) as well as Galí
(2008, 2015) and Woodford (2003). Solution methods and properties of linear-
quadratic framework, both under commitment and discretion, are discussed in
Currie and Levine (1993), Söderlind (1999), Debortoli and Nunes (2006), Dennis
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(2007) and Benigno and Woodford (2012). For a formal introduction of loose
commitment problems see Debortoli and Nunes (2010), while theoretical results
on dynamic recursive problems with limited commitment are given by Marcet and
Marimon (2019).
In particular, this work is closely related Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007)
and Debortoli et al. (2014). Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) extend the stochastic
replanning model of Roberds (1987) to optimal monetary policy in a baseline New
Keynesian model. Debortoli et al. (2014) develop a solution algorithm suitable for
larger models and apply it to a Smets and Wouters (2007) model. In this paper, I
tackle the optimal monetary problem under loose commitment in an intermediate
model with staggered price and wage setting. This choice is justified as follows:
On the one hand, the introduction of sticky wages implies that the optimal policy
has to strike a balance between price and wage inflation stabilisation. This cre-
ates new interesting equilibrium outcomes that are not present in Schaumburg and
Tambalotti (2007). On the other hand, keeping the model simple allows us to de-
rive a welfare loss function directly from rational agents’ utility which ultimately
leads to a better evaluation of the impact of credibility on welfare.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 describes the key assumptions
of the non-policy block of the model. Section 2.3 explains and introduces formally
the loose commitment framework and the optimal policy problem. Section 2.4
investigates the relationship between central bank credibility and welfare losses.
Section 2.5 comments on the transmission mechanism and business cycle properties
of the loose commitment policy under different degrees of commitment. Section
2.6 concludes.
2.2 The model
In this section I introduce the main features and equations that characterise the
non-policy block of the model. The crucial assumption in this framework is the co-
existence of staggered price and wage setting which creates two important sources
of nominal rigidities.
The general equilibrium economy is populated by households, firms and a mon-
etary authority whose objectives and characteristics are introduced and formalised
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in Section 2.3.
2.2.1 Households
A representative household consumes a composite good Ct and supplies differen-
tiated labour services. In particular, the representative household consists of a
continuum of members (workers), each specialised in a specific type of labour in-
dexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. This assumption, along with the production technology used
by firms, creates some degree of monopoly power in the labour market so that
workers can set their own wage given employment decisions of firms.
Differentiated labour services create a wage markup over the equilibrium wage
that would prevail in the case of homogeneous labour. This is reflected in a wedge
Mw between the real wage and the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and labour supply, as shown by
Wt
Pt
=MwMRSt
where Wt is the nominal wage, Pt is the aggregate price level, and MRSt denotes
the marginal rate of substitution.1
An additional source of inefficiency comes from wage staggering. Every period
only a fraction (1 − θw) of workers is allowed to renegotiate their nominal wage
to its optimal level W ∗t . Therefore, whenever workers have a chance to reset their
nominal wage, they will choose W ∗t in order the maximise their expected future
flows of discounted utility.
The first order optimality condition for W ∗t is given by
∞∑
k=0
(βθw)
kEt
[
Nt+k|tZt+kC−σt+k
(
W ∗t
Pt+k
−MwMRSt+k|t
)]
= 0 (2.1)
where Nt+k|t =
(
W ∗t
Wt+k
)−w
Nt+k is labour demand for those workers who are re-
setting their wage in period t and Zt is a preference (demand) shock that follows
1As shown in Galí (2015), this deviation from the efficient allocation can be corrected with
the introduction of an appropriate subsidy.
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an exogenous AR(1) process
zt = ρzzt−1 + εz,t
with zt ≡ logZt.
It can be shown (Galí, 2015) that by log-linearising around a zero inflation
steady state, the wage setting equation (2.1) can be simplified in terms of nominal
wage inflation to obtain
piwt = βEt
[
piwt+1
]− λwµ̂wt (2.2)
where λw ≡ (1−θw)(1−βθw)θw(1+wϕ) and µ̂wt ≡ µwt − µw keeps track of the deviations of the
average wage markup µwt from its frictionless counterpart µw ≡ logMw.
2.2.2 Firms
The supply side of the economy is populated by a continuum of firms that produce
differentiated goods. Each firm, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], is endowed with the following
production function
Yt(i) = AtNt(i)
1−α
where At represents technology and it follows an exogenous autoregressive process
at = ρaat−1 + εa,t
with at ≡ logAt.
Each firm takes as inputs differentiated labour types supplied by workers and
aggregates them according to
Nt(i) ≡
(∫ 1
0
Nt(i, j)
w−1
w dj
) w
w−1
where w denotes the elasticity of substitution among labour varieties.
Differentiated goods implies monopolistic competition in the goods market thus
each firm i is allowed to set its own price to maximise profits. However, each period
only a fraction (1 − θp) is allowed to readjust their prices, leaving the remaining
θp firms with their previously set price. Similarly to the wage setting problem for
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workers, when a firm has been given the chance to reset its price P ∗t it has to take
into account of expected future profits discounted by the probability of not being
able to re-optimise again. Hence, the optimal P ∗t is set according to the following
optimality condition:
∞∑
k=0
θkpEt
[
Λt,t+kYt+k|t
P ∗t −MpC
′
t+k(Yt+k|t)
Pt+k
]
= 0 (2.3)
where Yt+k|t =
(
P ∗t
Pt+k
)−
Ct+k is the demand for those firms that are resetting their
price today, C′(·) is marginal costs andMp ≡ p−1p is the frictionless price markup.
As standard in the literature, the above optimality condition (2.3) can be log-
linearised around a zero steady state inflation to obtain an equation in terms of
the nominal price level pipt and deviations from the frictionless (log) markup µ̂
p
t ≡
µpt − µt, that is
pipt = βEt
[
pipt+1
]− λpµ̂pt (2.4)
where λp ≡ (1−θp)(1−βθp)θp 1−α1−α+αp .
2.2.3 Equilibrium
The non-policy block of the model is completed by adding two additional equations.
The first equation is an identity that keeps track of the changes in price and wage
inflation and the correspondent changes in the real wage gap, that is
ω˜t = ω˜t−1 + piwt − pipt −∆ωnt (2.5)
where ω˜t is the real wage gap and ∆ωnt = φωa∆at denotes the real wage growth in
the absence of sticky price and wages.
The second equation is a dynamic IS equation. It describes the inter-temporal
optimal allocation of households and it is obtained by combining the Euler equation
with the market clearing condition on the goods market. Its log-linearised version
is
y˜t = Et [y˜t+1]− 1
σ
(
it − Et
[
pipt+1
]− rnt ) (2.6)
where y˜ is the output gap and rnt = −σ(1 − ρa)φyaat + (1 − ρz)zt is the natural
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real interest rate.
Finally, it is useful to rearrange the price and wage inflation curves in terms
of real wage gap and output gap. Notice that deviations from frictionless markup
can be rewritten as
µ̂pt = −
α
1− αy˜t − ω˜t
µ̂wt = ω˜t −
(
σ +
ϕ
1− α
)
y˜t
which can be substituted into (2.4) and (2.2) to obtain
pipt = βEt
[
pipt+1
]
+ κpy˜t + λpω˜t (2.7)
piwt = βEt
[
piwt+1
]
+ κwy˜t − λwω˜t (2.8)
where κp ≡ α1−αλp and κw =
(
σ + ϕ1−α
)
λw.
The non-policy block is therefore entirely described by equation (2.5), (2.6),
(2.7) and (2.8). The model is parametrised following Galí (2015) and the standard
deviations of the exogenous shock processes are calibrated to match those in Smets
and Wouters (2007). Values are reported in Table 2.1.
2.3 Optimal policy under imperfect credibility
The presence of monopolistic competition on wages and goods markets, coupled
with staggering wage and price setting, creates a set of possible equilibrium alloc-
ations that are different from the efficient allocation that would prevail in absence
of sticky prices and wages. This gives a role to the monetary authority to select
one of these possible equilibria in order to minimise the distortions. In particu-
lar, the policy maker will coordinate with the private sector of the economy and
will announce her plans in order to manage expectations of future variables and
control contemporaneous quantities. This is equivalent to having a monetary au-
thority that minimise a loss function which represents deviations from an efficient
allocation subject to a set of constraints given by the dynamic equations of the
private sector.
As shown by Galí (2015), in a simple New Keynesian framework such as the one
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Table 2.1: Parameters and shocks standard deviations
Description Parameter Value
Discount factor β 0.99
Output elasticity of labour α 0.25
Risk aversion σ 1
Frisch elasticity of labour supply ϕ 5
Elasticity of substitution between goods p 9
Elasticity of substitution between labour varieties w 4.5
Price stickiness θp 0.75
Wage stickiness θw 0.75
Cost-push shock autoregressive parameter ρup 0.8
Wage shock autoregressive parameter ρuw 0.8
Technology shock autoregressive parameter ρa 0.9
Preference shock autoregressive parameter ρz 0.5
Cost-push shock standard deviation σεp 0.0895
Wage shock standard deviation σεw 0.1536
Technology shock standard deviation σεa 0.6282
Preference shock standard deviation σεz 0.2113
Notes: Structural parameters and standard deviations of shock processes. Structural para-
meters are taken from Galí (2015). Standard deviations of innovations to shock processes are
calibrated to match Smets and Wouters (2007). Notice that cost-push and wage shock pro-
cesses in Smets and Wouters (2007) follow an ARMA(1,1) thus standard deviations cannot
be compared directly.
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considered here an objective function for the social planner can be derived directly
from the welfare of maximising agents. Up to a second order approximation, welfare
losses relative to an efficient steady state with zero price and wage inflation can be
represented by
L =
1
2
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ψyy˜
2
t + ψppi
p2
t + ψwpi
w2
t
}
where ψy ≡
(
σ + ϕ+α1−α
)
, ψp ≡ pλp , and ψw ≡
w(1−α)
λw
.
Notice that the weights attached to deviations of endogenous variables from
their target are a function of the structural parameters in the model. In particular,
the relative importance of price and wage inflation deviations in the loss function is
determined by the relative degree of price and wage stickiness, λp(θp) and λw(θw),
along with the magnitude of average markups,Mp(p) andMw(w). For instance,
a higher degree of price stickiness (higher θp thus lower λp) implies a greater price
dispersion while higher markups (higherMp due to higher p) mean that the price
level is further from its efficient level. Therefore, even small deviations of price
inflation from target result in large deviations from the efficient steady state, thus
larger welfare costs.
The optimal policy framework considered here is loose commitment. Under
loose commitment, the policy maker devises plans and commits to future alloc-
ations but may occasionally renege on past promises and readjust plans with an
exogenous positive probability. The public (private sector) is aware of this probabil-
ity and forms expectations consistently which is why promises on future allocations
are perceived as imperfectly credible.
Formally, the decision to commit to the previously announced plan or reoptim-
ise in the current period is based on the realisation of a two-states i.i.d. stochastic
process {ηt}∞t=0 which every period takes the values of 1 with probability γ, or 0
with probability 1− γ.
Consider the decision of the planner at period t. If ηt = 1, the planner honours
past promises and does not revise its plan for future allocations. If ηt = 0, the
planner reneges on the previously announced plan and chooses allocations based
on a new state-contingent plan which is announced to the public. The history of
realisations of this stochastic process therefore determines the implemented and an-
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nounced plans, thus macroeconomic outcomes. For instance, consider the following
realisation:
ηt =
0 t = 31 t 6= 3
At period t = 0, an initial plan is formulated and kept for the following two
consecutive periods. In period t = 3, the planner reneges on past promises and
announces a new plan which is kept from that period onwards.
Notice how this setting nests the limiting cases of full commitment and dis-
cretion as special cases: if the probability of commitment is γ = 1, the stochastic
reoptimisation never occurs and the economy evolves according to the initially for-
mulated plan, while if γ = 0 the policymaker has no credibility since the public
always expects the monetary authority to deviate from announced plans.
The policy maker solves the following minimisation problem:
Lγ (x−1) = min{y˜t,pipt ,piwt ,ω˜t,it}∞t=0
E−1
∞∑
t=0
(βγ)t
{
1
2
(
ψyy˜
2
t + ψppi
p2
t + ψwpi
w2
t
)
+ β (1− γ)Lγ (xt)
}
s.t. pipt = βE
η
t
[
pipt+1
]
+ κpy˜t + λpω˜t + u
p
t
piwt = βE
η
t
[
piwt+1
]
+ κwy˜t − λwω˜t + uwt
ω˜t = ω˜t−1 + piwt − pipt −∆ωnt
y˜t = Eηt [y˜t+1]−
1
σ
(
it − Eηt
[
pipt+1
]− rnt )
where Lγ(xt) denotes welfare loss associated to a degree of commitment γ and xt ≡
(upt , u
w
t , at, zt)
′
is a vector of exogenous disturbances. Et denotes the usual rational
expectations operator and Eηt denotes the expectation operator which takes the
possibility of reoptimisation into account. For instance, price inflation expectations
are defined by Eηt
[
pipt+1
] ≡ γEt[pipt+1|ηt+1 = 1] + (1− γ)Et[pipt+1|ηt+1 = 0].
The solution to the above minimisation problem is a set of state-contingent
decision rules which is obtained as explained in Debortoli et al. (2014). In the
remainder of the paper, I will denote the set of decision rules or the outcome under
these decision rules as a degree-γ policy.
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2.4 Welfare and credibility
The relative sizes of welfare losses in the limiting cases of full commitment and dis-
cretion are well known and easily explained. Due to the ability to credibly commit
to announced plans, the full commitment planner can minimise the deviations from
targets by managing expectations and spreading the negative impact of exogenous
shocks over several periods. On the contrary, the discretionary planner is unable to
do so as she only has control over contemporaneous variables. As a result, the full
commitment policy delivers the best outcome with welfare losses at their minimum,
whereas the discretionary policy attains the worst outcome with welfare losses at
their maximum. Moreover, the size of welfare in the limiting cases of full commit-
ment and discretion defines the total gains from commitment since switching from
a discretionary policy to a full commitment policy leads to the largest reduction
in welfare losses.
An interesting question is to investigate the size of welfare losses for inter-
mediate levels of credibility and how these losses change going from one degree of
commitment to another. Consider the case of a central bank investing in increasing
its credibility: is this investment paid off in terms of welfare gains? And viceversa,
how costly is to lose credibility?
In this section, I compute unconditional and conditional welfare associated to
a degree of commitment γ ∈ [0, 1] and compare it with welfare in the limiting
cases of full commitment and discretion. Unconditional welfare losses are given by
the function Lγ(·) defined in Section 2.3 and computed as described by Debortoli
et al. (2014). Conditional welfare is defined by the value of welfare knowing the
realisation of the shocks xt at period t and it can be derived directly from un-
conditional welfare. Due to the linear-quadratic nature of the problem the welfare
function takes the quadratic form Lγ (xt−1) = x′t−1Pγxt−1 thus all information is
summarised in a matrix Pγ , each for each probability of commitment γ.
A useful measure of the gains from commitment is obtained by computing the
reduction in welfare losses associated to a degree of commitment γ relative to
largest possible reduction in welfare losses. That is, welfare gains associated to
a degree–γ policy are reported as a fraction of the total gains from commitment.
First, total gains from commitment are computed as the difference between the
welfare losses under discretion, L0, and welfare losses under full commitment, L1.
2.4 Welfare and credibility 57
Figure 2.1: Welfare gains from commitment.
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Notes: The figure plots the welfare gains associated to a probability of commitment as a fraction
of the total gains from commitment. That is, the welfare gains from a degree–γ policy, L0 − Lγ ,
are normalised by the total gains from commitment, that is L0 − L1. The left panel reports
unconditional welfare, while the right panel reports welfare conditional on knowing the realisation
of shocks in the first quarter. The dashed line is the 45 degrees line.
Second, welfare gains associated to a degree of commitment γ are computed as
the difference between the welfare losses under discretion and welfare losses under
a degree–γ policy, that is L0 − Lγ . Finally, relative welfare gains are reported as
(L0−Lγ)/(L0−L1).2
Figure 2.1 shows how relative welfare gains change with the probability of com-
mitment γ. Starting from discretion, γ = 0, the welfare gains increase with the
degree of commitment until full commitment is achieved, γ = 1. Higher probabil-
ities of commitment translate into a more efficient management of output gap and
inflation expectations, which contributes to keep welfare–relevant variables closer
to their target.
2Notice that by construction the above measure is bounded by the [0, 1] interval, with the
discretion and full commitment cases having relative welfare gains equal to 0 and 1 respectively.
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Figure 2.1 also suggests that the marginal gain from increasing commitment
is largely independent from the initial credibility level. Since the relative welfare
gains increase with the probability of commitment at an almost linear pace, any
increase (decrease) in credibility is associated with a marginal gain (loss) that is
similar for any initial credibility level. This finding stands in between existing
results in the literature: while Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) find that most
of the gains from commitment are present at low credibility levels, Debortoli et al.
(2014) report that substantial gains from increasing credibility are only present at
higher degrees of commitment.
Welfare based measures give us valuable information on the gains from in-
creased credibility but they hide the relative contribution of output gap and infla-
tion volatilities to the overall loss. Indeed, depending on the relative weights in the
loss function, lower welfare losses are achieved by optimising the trade-off between
output gap and inflation volatilities. An interesting finding is that the nature of
this trade-off changes with the level of commitment.
Given a probability of commitment γ, standard deviations of welfare-relevant
variables are computed and reported in Figure 2.2. When the credibility of the
central bank approaches the limiting case of full commitment, the planner can
effectively reduce the variance of both output gap, price inflation, and wage infla-
tion. However, starting from lower credibility levels, any improvement in welfare
is achieved by being more tough on both price and wage inflation at a cost of a
higher output gap volatility. This is because stabilising price and wage inflation is
relatively more important than stabilising output gap deviations; given the relative
weights in the loss function, a reduction in price or wage inflation volatility is more
beneficial than the same reduction in output gap volatility. As Figure 2.2 shows,
this finding is robust to alternative calibrations of the weight attached to output
gap ψy.
2.5 Credibility and business cycle properties
In order to better understand the transmission mechanism and properties of the
optimal policy under loose commitment, impulse responses to exogenous shocks
and simulated moments of endogenous variables are computed and reported in
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Figure 2.2: Credibility and target variables volatility.
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Notes: The figure reports the standard deviations of output gap, price inflation, and wage
inflation under a degree-γ policy with γ ∈ {1, 0.9, 0.7, 0.5, 0.3}. The left panel shows the volatility
of output gap against the volatility of price inflation. The right panel shows the volatility of
output gap against the volatility of wage inflation. For each degree of commitment, the weight
on output gap takes values in the interval [2ψy, 0.5ψy] as a robustness check.
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this section. Four orthogonal shocks are considered here: two inefficiency shocks,
a technology shock, and a preference (demand) shock.3
Due to the nature of the loose commitment policy, the response of endogenous
variables at any point in time is dependent on the realisation of a Bernoulli process
{ηt}∞t=0. Whenever a reoptimisation is triggered, ηt = 0, the planner reneges on
past promises and reformulates a new plan which is announced to the public.
According to recursive contracts theory (Marcet and Marimon, 2019), information
on past promises is completely summarised by Lagrange multipliers, λt, which
enter the state space as co-state variables. As explained by Debortoli et al. (2014),
the random variable that controls reoptimisations ηt is added to the decision rules
as a multiplicative term to the vector of Lagrange multipliers, so that wherever a
reoptimisation occurs the Lagrange multipliers are set to zero, ηtλt = 0, and past
promises are irrelevant.
Since the reoptimisation shock ηt enters non-linearly in the decision rules this
creates non trivial dynamics of endogenous variables. To better understand how
the central bank responds to exogenous shocks and their effect on second moments,
two types of impulse responses are computed: First, impulse responses subject to a
particular realisation of {ηt}∞t=0 are computed given a probability of commitment.
Second, impulse responses where all possible histories of reoptimisation are integ-
rated out are computed to show the average behaviour of endogenous variables
under a degree-γ commitment policy.
Figure 2.3 shows the impulse responses to a wage shock under a loose com-
mitment policy with probability of commitment γ = 0.8 and compares this to the
limiting case of full commitment and discretion.4 Given the nature of reoptimisa-
tion shock, the probability of a central banker to commit to the announced plan for
the next k quarters follows a geometric distribution, which implies that expected
value of the next reoptimisation is 1/(1 − γ) = 5. Therefore, I assume a history
of reoptimisations where the planner reneges on past promises and reformulates a
new plan every five quarters.
3The impulse response to a preference shock is not reported here. Under any degree of com-
mitment, the planner can perfectly offset any movement in zt by adjusting the nominal interest
rate it. As a result, none of the remaining endogenous variables are affected by the shock.
4The impulse responses to a cost-push shock and a productivity shock display a similar be-
haviour when it comes to occasional reoptimisations. Nevertheless, the behaviour of endogenous
variables is different and it is commented below in the case of average impulse responses.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse response to a persistent wage shock.
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Notes: The figure shows the response of endogenous variables under a degree-0.8 policy subject
to a history of reoptimisations where the planner reneges on its past promises every 5 quarters.
This is compared to impulse responses under full commitment, discretion, and a degree-0.8 policy
where reoptimisation never occurs.
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Under the full commitment policy, the planner is able to perfectly insulate price
inflation from the persistent wage shock and to quickly reduce wage inflation by
managing expectations of future price and wage inflation. However, the reduction
in inflation is achieved by bringing the economy into a recession. Under the loose
commitment policy, the (partial) lack of credibility implies that the planner is not
able to control expectations as effectively as in the full commitment case, which
is ultimately reflected in a worse outcome—higher price and wage inflation and a
deeper recession—for the first five quarters. Nevertheless, the reoptimisation shock
hits in the fifth quarter so the planner can renege on the previously announced plan
and choose a better outcome in the subsequent period as Figure 2.3 shows.5 Indeed,
by fooling the private sector the planner can substantially reduce the output gap
at cost of a slightly higher price and wage inflation.
Due to the discontinuities created by the random process ηt, impulse responses
conditional on a particular history of reoptimisations are not representative of
the typical behaviour of endogenous variables, therefore making the comparison
of impulse responses and second moments a harder task. Here, I report average
impulse responses: for each shock and each degree of commitment, a large number
of impulse responses subject to a random realisation of the reoptimisation process
is computed and then averaged. The size of each shock is equal to its respective
standard deviation.
Figure 2.4 shows the optimal response of a central banker with degree of com-
mitment γ ∈ {1, 0.9, 0.5, 0.3, 0} to a persistent cost-push shock. Central bankers
with high credibility can bring down price inflation at a faster rate then low credibil-
ity ones. Nevertheless, the difference in price inflation trajectories is quantitatively
small. The usual trade-off between inflation and output gap still applies: better
price inflation outcomes come at a cost of a more persistent recession. Wage in-
flation is pro-cyclical at high degrees of commitment while it is counter-cyclical at
lower degrees, even though its response is quantitatively small. Notice that, for any
degree of commitment, the response of all endogenous variables at impact lies in
between the limiting cases of full commitment and discretion; this is not surprising
given the forward-looking nature of variables and that agents’ expectations are a
5As Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) put it, this is equivalent to having a newly appointed
central banker in period 6. The new central banker has neither obligations nor incentive to honour
past promises.
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Figure 2.4: Average impulse response to a persistent cost-push shock.
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Notes: The figure shows the average impulse response for different degrees of commitment. A
large number (10000) of different impulse responses are simulated and then averaged. For each
simulation, a random realisation of the reoptimisation process {ηt}15t=1 is drawn and the impulse
response conditional on that history is computed.
weighted average of expectations under full commitment and discretion, at least
in the first period.6
Similarly to a cost-push shock, central bankers with higher degrees of com-
mitment can achieve better price and wage inflation profiles after a wage shock.
Interestingly, the whole path of price inflation, wage inflation, and real wages lies
in between the full commitment and discretion cases as shown in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.6 reports the response of endogenous variables to a technology shock
under different degrees of commitment. When both prices and wages are sticky,
the efficient allocation cannot be achieved thus technology shocks affect the real
6This result does not necessarily hold in larger models with backward-looking features like
price and wage indexation to past inflation or habits in consumption.
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Figure 2.5: Average impulse response to a persistent wage shock.
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Notes: The figure shows the average impulse response for different degrees of commitment. A
large number (10000) of different impulse responses are simulated and then averaged. For each
simulation, a random realisation of the reoptimisation process {ηt}15t=1 is drawn and the impulse
response conditional on that history is computed.
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variables of the model and their natural counterparts differently. In this scenario
the optimal response is to catch up with the movements in the natural output
and natural real wage by minimising the distortion created by price and wage
dispersion. Therefore, in response to a technology shock the real wage rises but at
considerably slower pace than its natural counterpart. As Figure 2.6 shows, this
is achieved by contemporaneously increasing wages and reducing prices. Central
bank credibility does not play a big role here as different degree-γ policies lead to
almost identical responses.
In order to get a better insight into the sources of welfare gains from com-
mitment, Table 2.2 reports model simulated moments for a range of degrees of
commitment.7 As highlighted in previous sections, higher credibility is associated
with lower price and wage inflation volatility but higher output gap variance. Real
wages and nominal interest rate standard deviations are decreasing with increasing
degrees of commitment. Cross correlations with output are affected by credibility
as well. Since central bankers with higher credibility are more able to insulate price
and wage inflation from shocks, the co-movements of these variables with output
is smaller.8
Finally, loose commitment changes the contribution of each shock to total vari-
ability for some of the variables. For instance, under full commitment, the variab-
ility of price inflation is almost entirely due to cost-push shocks. However, under
intermediate degrees of commitment, price inflation volatility is explained mostly
by cost-push and wage shocks.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper considers a monetary policy framework that lies in between the extreme
cases of full commitment and discretion. Under loose commitment, the monetary
authority commits to a state-contingent optimal policy but occasionally reneges
7Given the decision rules associated to a degree-γ policy, the model is simulated 5000 times
with 1000 periods for each simulation.
8Small cross correlations with output might also result from a composition of positive and
negative correlations. In particular, when the model is simulated conditional on cost-push shocks
only, the cross correlation of wage inflation with output becomes positive at higher degrees of
commitment. Tables containing empirical moments conditional on shocks are reported in the
Appendix.
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Figure 2.6: Average impulse response to a persistent technology shock.
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Notes: The figure shows the average impulse response for different degrees of commitment. A
large number (10000) of different impulse responses are simulated and then averaged. For each
simulation, a random realisation of the reoptimisation process {ηt}15t=1 is drawn and the impulse
response conditional on that history is computed.
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Table 2.2: Simulated moments
Degree of commitment
Variable 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.0
Standard deviation
Output gap y˜ 4.313 4.424 4.007 3.514 2.760
Price inflation pip 0.331 0.352 0.483 0.540 0.603
Wage inflation piw 0.351 0.390 0.583 0.668 0.763
Real wage ω 2.553 2.602 2.843 2.957 3.091
Interest rate i 0.709 0.826 1.356 1.402 1.037
Output y 4.555 4.660 4.264 3.803 3.118
Cross correlation with output
Output gap y˜ 0.949 0.951 0.941 0.925 0.887
Price inflation pip -0.064 -0.213 -0.565 -0.639 -0.714
Wage inflation piw -0.112 -0.264 -0.668 -0.770 -0.876
Real wage ω -0.357 -0.348 -0.360 -0.366 -0.368
Interest rate i -0.265 -0.470 -0.762 -0.798 -0.911
Notes: Standard deviations and cross correlations with output are reported
for each degree of commitment γ ∈ {1, 0.9, 0.5, 0.3, 0}. Moments are computed
by simulating the model 5000 times under a degree-γ policy for 1000 periods.
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Table 2.3: Variance decomposition
Degree of commitment
Shock 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.0
Output gap
Cost-push up 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.011
Wage uw 0.987 0.985 0.987 0.988 0.989
Technology a 0* 0* 0* 0* 0*
Demand z 0 0 0 0 0
Price inflation
Cost-push up 0.95 0.86 0.504 0.416 0.344
Wage uw 0 0.095 0.471 0.564 0.639
Technology a 0.05 0.045 0.025 0.02 0.017
Demand z 0 0 0 0 0
Wage inflation
Cost-push up 0.014 0.012 0.006 0.006 0.005
Wage uw 0.984 0.986 0.993 0.994 0.994
Technology a 0.003 0.002 0.001 0* 0*
Demand z 0 0 0 0 0
Interest rate
Cost-push up 0.044 0.035 0.037 0.043 0.085
Wage uw 0.865 0.897 0.937 0.932 0.868
Technology a 0.061 0.046 0.019 0.018 0.033
Demand z 0.03 0.022 0.008 0.008 0.014
Notes: For each degree of commitment γ ∈ {1, 0.9, 0.5, 0.3, 0}, the
variance is computed by simulating the model conditional on one
shock only. The conditional variance is then divided by total vari-
ance to measure the contribution of each shock to overall volatility.
Values smaller than 0.001 have been reported as 0*.
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on past promises and announces a new plan with a positive probability. This
probability is known to the rational agents of the model which will incorporate it
in their information set when forming expectations. The degree of commitment is
interpreted as central bank credibility: central banks with high credibility will stick
to previously announced plan and reoptimise only on few occasions, while those
with low credibility will renege on past promises more often. Also, credibility
influences the ability to manage future expectations of macroeconomic variables.
In a standard model with price and wage rigidity, the described monetary policy
framework is used to understand the relationship between central bank credibility
and welfare losses, as well as the business cycle properties under a loose commit-
ment optimal policy. When a central bank achieves higher credibility, the welfare
loss associated to the optimal policy is lower. This result holds at any degree of
commitment, from discretion to full commitment. Moreover, the welfare gain from
increasing credibility is almost independent on the initial credibility level, that is
the marginal reduction in welfare losses is roughly equal for low, medium, or high
degrees of commitment.
The trade-off between stabilising output gap and inflation changes with the
probability of commitment. At lower degrees of commitment welfare improvements
are obtained by being more tough on price and wage inflation at a cost of higher
output gap volatility, while at higher degrees of commitment welfare improvements
are brought by controlling the volatility of all welfare-relevant variables.
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Tax function definition and properties
Definition 1 (Tax function). T : R+ → R is a tax function that maps labour
income into taxes. The tax function T has the following properties:
(p1) T is continuous and differentiable in every point of the domain.
(p2) T is convex, that is
T (λy1 + (1− λ) y2) ≤ λT (y1)+ (1− λ) T (y2)
for every y1, y2 ∈ R+ and λ ∈ [0, 1].
(p3) T is monotonically increasing, that is
T (y1) ≥ T (y2)
for every y1, y2 ∈ R+ that satisfy y1 ≥ y2.
(p4) Its first derivative T ′ is such that
0 ≤ T ′ (y) ≤ 1
for every y ∈ R+.
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(p5) Its first derivative T ′ is monotonically increasing, that is
T ′ (y1) ≥ T ′ (y2)
for every y1, y2 ∈ R+ that satisfy y1 ≥ y2.
A.2 Proofs
Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1. Since y2 ≤ y1, we have that y2 ≤ y1+y22 ≤ y1. Using the
monotonicity of the first derivative of T (property p5), it follows that
T ′ (y2) ≤ T ′(y1 + y2
2
)
≤ T ′ (y1) .
Proposition 1 is obtained by applying the definitions of marginal tax rates under
joint and separate taxation.
Proposition 2
Proof of Proposition 2. Let us define y as y ≡ y1+y22 . It is immediate to see that y
is a convex combination of y1 and y2 with λ = 12 , that is
y = λy1 + (1− λ) y2 = 1
2
y1 +
1
2
y2 .
By the convexity of T (property p2), it follows that
T (y) ≤ 1
2
T (y1)+ 1
2
T (y2)
2T (y) ≤ T (y1)+ T (y2)
for all y1, y2 ∈ R+.
Proposition 2 is obtained by using the definition of household tax liabilities
under joint and separate taxation respectively.
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Proposition 3
Proof of Proposition 3. Proposition 3 relies on the fact that tax liabilities under
joint taxation depend on the sum of primary and secondary earners’ income only.
Since
(
y1s , y
2
s
)
is such that
y1s = y
1
j −∆1, y2s = y2j + ∆2
and ∆1 = ∆2, it follows that
y1s + y
2
s = y
1
j −∆1 + y2j + ∆2 = y1j + y1j (A.1)
hence
y1s + y
2
s
2
=
y1j + y
1
j
2
.
Using the definition of tax liabilities under joint taxation, we can establish that
T joint
(
y1s , y
2
s
)
= 2T
(
y1s + y
2
s
2
)
= 2T
(
y1j + y
2
j
2
)
= T joint
(
y1j , y
2
j
)
which combined with (A.1) gives
y1s + y
2
s − T joint
(
y1s , y
2
s
)
= y1j + y
1
j − T joint
(
y1j , y
2
j
)
. (A.2)
Corollary 1 guarantees that for any pair
(
y1s , y
2
s
)
we have that
y1s + y
2
s − T joint
(
y1s , y
2
s
) ≥ y1s + y2s − T sep (y1s , y2s) . (A.3)
Combining equality (A.2) with inequality (A.3) completes the proof.
A.3 Household problem optimality conditions
In this section, I show the optimality conditions of the limited commitment house-
hold problem introduced in Section 1.4. Following Marcet and Marimon (2019), the
Lagrangean of the problem can be rearranged by expressing the Pareto weights on
household members’ utility as a function of the Lagrange multipliers on past peri-
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ods participation constraints. Formally, the Pareto weight on household member
m ∈ {1, 2} utility function evolves according to
µmt = µ
m
t−1 + α
m
t
for every t ≥ 1, where αmt is the Lagrange multiplier on the participation constraint
of household member m in period t and µm0 ≡ µm is the initial Pareto weight which
is given as a parameter of the model. This formulation is useful as it allows us
to measure the size of household members’ bargaining power in period t, µmt ,
without having to keep track of the whole history of Lagrange multipliers up to
that period, {αmτ }tτ=1. The Pareto weight µmt therefore becomes a co-state variable
of the dynamic problem.
The Lagrangean of the household problem is given by
L =
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
{
µ1t
(
γ1 logQt +
(
q1t
)1−σ1 − 1
1− σ1 − φ
1
(
h1t + d
1
t
)1+1/η1
1 + 1/η1
)
+ µ2t
(
γ2 logQt +
(
q2t
)1−σ2 − 1
1− σ2 − φ
2
(
h2t + d
2
t
)1+1/η2
1 + 1/η2
)
− λt
(
q1t + q
2
t + T
(
wtθ
1
t h
1
t , wtθ
2
t h
2
t
)− wtθ1t h1t − wtθ2t h2t )
− ζt
(
Qt −A
(
d1t
)δ1 (d2t )δ2)
− ν1t
(
θ1t+1 −
(
1− δ1θ
)
θ1t − h1t − δ1θ θ¯1
)
− ν2t
(
θ2t+1 −
(
1− δ2θ
)
θ2t − h2t − δ2θ θ¯2
)
− α1tV 1D
(
θ1t
)
− α2tV 2D
(
θ2t
)}
where V 1D (·) and V 2D (·) are the value functions of the outside option problems of
primary and secondary earners respectively.
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The associated system of optimality conditions is
µ1
(
q1t
)−σ1
= λt (A.4)
µ2
(
q2t
)−σ2
= λt (A.5)(
µ1γ1 + µ2γ2
) δ1
d1t
= µ1φ1
(
h1t + d
1
t
)1/η1 (A.6)
(
µ1γ1 + µ2γ2
) δ2
d2t
= µ2φ2
(
h2t + d
2
t
)1/η2 (A.7)
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(A.10)
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Qt = A
(
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)δ1 (d2t )δ2 (A.15)
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θ1t h
1
t +
1
2
θ2t h
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t (A.16)
αAY
(
HDt
)α−1
= wt (A.17)
HSt = H
D
t (A.18)
along with the Kuhn–Tucker conditions on primary earner’s participation con-
straint
α1t ≥ 0 (A.19)
∞∑
τ=0
βτu1
(
Qt+τ , q
1
t+τ , h
1
t+τ , d
1
t+τ
) ≥ V 1D (θ1t ) (A.20)
α1t
( ∞∑
τ=0
βτu1
(
Qt+τ , q
1
t+τ , h
1
t+τ , d
1
t+τ
)− V 1D (θ1t )
)
= 0 (A.21)
A.4 Value of the outside option 75
and secondary earner’s participation constraint
α2t ≥ 0 (A.22)
∞∑
τ=0
βτu2
(
Qt+τ , q
2
t+τ , h
2
t+τ , d
2
t+τ
) ≥ V 2D (θ2t ) (A.23)
α2t
( ∞∑
τ=0
βτu2
(
Qt+τ , q
2
t+τ , h
2
t+τ , d
2
t+τ
)− V 2D (θ2t )
)
= 0. (A.24)
The relationship between Lagrange multipliers, Pareto weights, and intra-household
renegotiations is entirely described by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions and the Pareto
weights’ law of motion. Whenever the participation constraint of household mem-
ber m is slack, the complementary slackness condition A.21 or A.24 implies that
the Lagrange multiplier αmt must be zero and the Pareto weight is constant, that
is
αmt = 0 =⇒ µmt = µmt−1 .
Conversely, if the participation constraint is binding the Lagrange multiplier is
strictly positive and the Pareto weight increases to ensure that the participation
constraint is satisfied as an equality, that is
αmt > 0 =⇒ µmt > µmt−1
and µmt is determined endogenously to satisfy
∞∑
τ=0
βτum
(
Qt+τ , q
m
t+τ , h
m
t+τ , d
m
t+τ
)
= V mD (θ
m
t ) .
A.4 Value of the outside option
The value function of divorce for primary and secondary earners appears in a
number of optimality conditions; namely in equations (A.10) and (A.11) as well as
in the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (A.19)–(A.21) and (A.22)–(A.24).
When solving the model, both value functions V 1D (·) and V 2D (·) as well as
their first derivatives have to be known in advance in order to check whether the
participation constraints are binding along the transition from the old steady state
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to the new steady state. Therefore, the outside option problem must be solved and
value functions obtained before solving the main problem.
The outside option problem for household member m ∈ {1, 2} can be re-
arranged into a recursive form as follows
V mD
(
θm
) ≡ max
{Q,qm,hm,dm,θm′}
{
um(Q, qm, hm, dm) + βV mD
(
θm
′)}
s.t. qm + T (wθmhm) = wθmhm ± tr
θm
′
= (1− δmθ )θm + hm + δmθ θm
Q = AQ(d
1)δ1(d2)δ2
where θm′ denotes next period stock of human capital and the hours devoted to
home production of the other household member are taken as given and assumed
to be at their steady state value.
The above recursive problem is solved independently from the main household
problem and the value function is obtained by value function iteration. In order
to increase the precision outside the grid points, I interpolate the value function
using Chebyshev polynomials.
The first derivative of the value function is obtained by applying the following
Envelope condition
V m
′
D
(
θm
′
(θm)
)
=
ν(θm)
β
at each grid point θm ∈ Θ and interpolating the obtained values afterwards. ν(·)
and θm′(·) denote the policy functions where ν is the Lagrange multiplier on the
human capital accumulation constraint.
A.5 Model solution
This section reports details on how to compute the transition from the steady state
under joint taxation to the steady state under separate taxation. Given the absence
of exogenous shocks in the model, the transition can be obtained as the solution
to a boundary value problem where the initial condition is given by the steady
state of state variables under joint taxation and the final condition is given by the
steady state under separate taxation. That is, the transition is simply a sequence
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of allocations that satisfy the optimality conditions of the household problem in
every period.
Formally, the transition is defined as follows. First, notice that the Kuhn–
Tucker conditions (A.19)–(A.21) and (A.22)–(A.24) can be redefined as
min
{
µ1t − µ1t−1,
∞∑
τ=0
βτu1
(
Qt+τ , q
1
t+τ , h
1
t+τ , d
1
t+τ
)− V 1D (θ1t )
}
= 0 (A.25)
min
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2
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2
t+τ , d
2
t+τ
)− V 2D (θ2t )
}
= 0 (A.26)
where the min operator ensures that both non-negativity and complementary slack-
ness conditions are satisfied.
Second, the system of household optimality conditions can be rearranged into
a f (xt, xt+1;µt, µt+1) = 0 form where xt ≡
(
Qt, q
1
t , q
2
t , h
1
t , h
2
t , d
1
t , d
2
t , θ
1
t , θ
2
t
)
is the
vector of endogenous variables and µt ≡
(
µ1t , µ
2
t
)
is the vector of Pareto weights at
period t. The function f is defined by
f(xt, xt+1;µt, µt+1) ≡
(
g(xt, xt+1;µt, µt+1)
h(xt, xt+1;µt, µt+1)
)
where g (·) represents the equalities (A.4)–(A.15) and h (·) represents the Kuhn–
Tucker conditions (A.25) and (A.26), that is
h(xt, xt+1;µt, µt+1) ≡
(
min
{
µ1t − µ1t−1,
∑∞
τ=0 β
τu1
(
Qt+τ , q
1
t+τ , h
1
t+τ , d
1
t+τ
)− V 1D (θ1t )}
min
{
µ2t − µ2t−1,
∑∞
τ=0 β
τu2
(
Qt+τ , q
2
t+τ , h
2
t+τ , d
2
t+τ
)− V 2D (θ2t )}
)
.
Third, denote by x ≡ {xt, µt}Tt=1 the sequence of allocations and Pareto weights
from period t = 1 to period t = T and by
F (x) ≡

f(x1, x2;µ1, µ2)
...
f(xt, xt+1;µt, µt+1)
...
f(xT , xT+1;µT , µT+1)
(A.27)
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the collection of optimality conditions. Notice that the initial condition on state
variables
(
θ10, θ
2
0
)
and co–state variables
(
µ10, µ
2
0
)
is given by their steady state
values under joint taxation. Moreover, T should be large enough to allow the
model to reach the steady state condition xT = xT+1 and µT = µT+1.
Finally, the transition from the steady state under joint taxation to the steady
state under separate taxation is given by the sequence of allocations and Pareto
weights that solves the system of equations A.27 defined above. That is, the
transition is the vector x∗ such that
F (x∗) = 0.
A.6 Initial bargaining power and gains from marriage
transition
This section contains figures illustrating the evolution of secondary earners’ value
of marriage and divorce and bargaining power after the tax reform. Each figure is
associated to a different initial Pareto weight on secondary earners’ utility.
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Figure A.1: Secondary earners’ values and bargaining power. Initial Pareto weight
µ2 = 0.88
(a) Secondary earners’ value of marriage
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(b) Secondary earners’ Pareto weight
(
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Notes: This figure shows the evolution of secondary earners’ value and bargaining power after
the tax reform. Panel (a) compares the value of staying in the household (marriage) to the value
of the best outside option (divorce) for secondary earners. Panel (b) shows the variation in the
Pareto weight on secondary earners’ utility.
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Figure A.2: Secondary earners’ values and bargaining power. Initial Pareto weight
µ2 = 0.89
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(b) Secondary earners’ Pareto weight
(
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)
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Notes: This figure shows the evolution of secondary earners’ value and bargaining power after
the tax reform. Panel (a) compares the value of staying in the household (marriage) to the value
of the best outside option (divorce) for secondary earners. Panel (b) shows the variation in the
Pareto weight on secondary earners’ utility.
A.6 Initial bargaining power and gains from marriage transition 81
Figure A.3: Secondary earners’ values and bargaining power. Initial Pareto weight
µ2 = 0.90
(a) Secondary earners’ value of marriage
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(
V 2D
)
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(b) Secondary earners’ Pareto weight
(
µ2
)
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Notes: This figure shows the evolution of secondary earners’ value and bargaining power after
the tax reform. Panel (a) compares the value of staying in the household (marriage) to the value
of the best outside option (divorce) for secondary earners. Panel (b) shows the variation in the
Pareto weight on secondary earners’ utility.
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Figure A.4: Secondary earners’ values and bargaining power. Initial Pareto weight
µ2 = 0.91
(a) Secondary earners’ value of marriage
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(b) Secondary earners’ Pareto weight
(
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)
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0.91
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Notes: This figure shows the evolution of secondary earners’ value and bargaining power after
the tax reform. Panel (a) compares the value of staying in the household (marriage) to the value
of the best outside option (divorce) for secondary earners. Panel (b) shows the variation in the
Pareto weight on secondary earners’ utility.
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Figure A.5: Secondary earners’ values and bargaining power. Initial Pareto weight
µ2 = 0.92
(a) Secondary earners’ value of marriage
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(
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(b) Secondary earners’ Pareto weight
(
µ2
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Periods
0.919
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Notes: This figure shows the evolution of secondary earners’ value and bargaining power after
the tax reform. Panel (a) compares the value of staying in the household (marriage) to the value
of the best outside option (divorce) for secondary earners. Panel (b) shows the variation in the
Pareto weight on secondary earners’ utility.
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Figure A.6: Secondary earners’ values and bargaining power. Initial Pareto weight
µ2 = 0.93
(a) Secondary earners’ value of marriage
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(b) Secondary earners’ Pareto weight
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Notes: This figure shows the evolution of secondary earners’ value and bargaining power after
the tax reform. Panel (a) compares the value of staying in the household (marriage) to the value
of the best outside option (divorce) for secondary earners. Panel (b) shows the variation in the
Pareto weight on secondary earners’ utility.
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Figure A.7: Secondary earners’ values and bargaining power. Initial Pareto weight
µ2 = 0.94
(a) Secondary earners’ value of marriage
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)
and divorce
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(b) Secondary earners’ Pareto weight
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Notes: This figure shows the evolution of secondary earners’ value and bargaining power after
the tax reform. Panel (a) compares the value of staying in the household (marriage) to the value
of the best outside option (divorce) for secondary earners. Panel (b) shows the variation in the
Pareto weight on secondary earners’ utility.
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Welfare gains from commitment: an alternative
measure
An alternative measure of the gains from commitment is given by the permanent
deviation in one of the targets that would equate the welfare loss under the full
commitment policy to the loss under a degree-γ policy. In other words, it is the
permanent deviation in either output gap, price inflation, or wage inflation that
would leave a planner indifferent between full commitment and a credibility level
γ. Considering output gap, this measure is formally defined by the permanent
deviation in output gap my such that
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ψy (y˜t,1 −my)2 + ψppip2t,1 + ψwpiw2t,1
}
= E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ψyy˜
2
t,γ + ψppi
p2
t,γ + ψwpi
w2
t,γ
}
(B.1)
where {y˜t,γ}∞t=0,
{
pipt,γ
}∞
t=0
and
{
piwt,γ
}∞
t=0
denote the optimal paths of output gap,
price inflation, and wage inflation under a degree of commitment γ. Welfare meas-
ures based on price and wage inflation, mp and mw, are defined and obtained
similarly.
Equation (B.1) can be simplified to obtain my as the solution to
m2y =
1− β
ψy
(Lγ − L1) .
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Figure B.1: Alternative welfare measure.
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Notes: Each figure reports the permanent deviation in the target variable necessary to match the
welfare loss under full commitment to a degree-γ welfare loss. Values closer to zero are associated
with lower welfare losses. Price and wage inflation are in % values.
Figure B.1 illustrates how these measures—my, mp and mw—change with the
degree of commitment. As expected, the discretionary policy bears the largest
costs with a permanent deviation of price and wage inflation of roughly 4% and
2.75% in annualised terms. Then all measures decrease with increasing degrees
of commitment, suggesting that welfare costs associated to permanent deviations
from target decrease with increasing credibility.
Even though the shape of the curves in Figure B.1 suggests some concavity,
this is only due to my, mp and mw being the solution to a quadratic equation and
should not being interpreted as a non-linear relationship between the degree of
commitment and the welfare measure. This finding confirms the results obtained
with the welfare–based measure in Section 2.3.
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B.2 Empirical moments
In this section additional tables containing the empirical moments are reported.
Each table corresponds to empirical moments of the model when only one shock
at a time is activated while other shocks are silent.
Table B.1: Simulated moments conditional on cost-push shock up
Degree of commitment
Variable 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.0
Standard deviation
Output gap y˜ 0.501 0.536 0.465 0.389 0.288
Price inflation pip 0.323 0.326 0.343 0.348 0.354
Wage inflation piw 0.041 0.042 0.046 0.051 0.056
Real wage ω 2.007 1.982 1.898 1.874 1.852
Interest rate i 0.148 0.154 0.259 0.29 0.302
Output y 0.501 0.536 0.465 0.389 0.288
Cross correlation with output
Output gap y˜ 1 1 1 1 1
Price inflation pip -0.192 -0.307 -0.623 -0.743 -0.919
Wage inflation piw 0.587 0.407 -0.259 -0.451 -0.635
Real wage ω 0.969 0.858 0.641 0.610 0.609
Interest rate i -0.02 -0.396 -0.87 -0.901 -0.910
Notes: Standard deviations and cross correlations with output are reported
for each degree of commitment γ ∈ {1, 0.9, 0.5, 0.3, 0}. Moments are computed
by simulating the model 5000 times under a degree-γ policy for 1000 periods.
Only cost-push shocks are activated.
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Table B.2: Simulated moments conditional on wage shock uw
Degree of commitment
Variable 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.0
Standard deviation
Output gap y˜ 4.284 4.392 3.98 3.492 2.745
Price inflation pip 0.003 0.108 0.331 0.406 0.482
Wage inflation piw 0.348 0.387 0.581 0.666 0.761
Real wage ω 1.399 1.523 1.992 2.173 2.371
Interest rate i 0.659 0.782 1.312 1.354 0.966
Output y 4.284 4.392 3.980 3.492 2.745
Cross correlation with output
Output gap y˜ 1 1 1 1 1
Price inflation pip -0.017 -0.473 -0.748 -0.801 -0.885
Wage inflation piw -0.141 -0.296 -0.72 -0.840 -0.997
Real wage ω -1 -0.894 -0.727 -0.709 -0.722
Interest rate i -0.214 -0.444 -0.774 -0.823 -0.981
Notes: Standard deviations and cross correlations with output are reported
for each degree of commitment γ ∈ {1, 0.9, 0.5, 0.3, 0}. Moments are computed
by simulating the model 5000 times under a degree-γ policy for 1000 periods.
Only wage shocks are activated.
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Table B.3: Simulated moments conditional on technology shock a
Degree of commitment
Variable 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.0
Standard deviation
Output gap y˜ 0.028 0.036 0.030 0.022 0.014
Price inflation pip 0.074 0.074 0.077 0.077 0.078
Wage inflation piw 0.019 0.018 0.015 0.014 0.013
Real wage ω 0.725 0.722 0.712 0.711 0.709
Interest rate i 0.175 0.178 0.185 0.187 0.188
Output y 1.460 1.463 1.456 1.452 1.447
Cross correlation with output
Output gap y˜ 0.695 0.620 0.520 0.501 0.476
Price inflation pip -0.605 -0.638 -0.674 -0.676 -0.674
Wage inflation piw 0.713 0.596 0.444 0.430 0.434
Real wage ω 0.814 0.813 0.807 0.806 0.806
Interest rate i -0.961 -0.968 -0.969 -0.967 -0.965
Notes: Standard deviations and cross correlations with output are reported
for each degree of commitment γ ∈ {1, 0.9, 0.5, 0.3, 0}. Moments are computed
by simulating the model 5000 times under a degree-γ policy for 1000 periods.
Only technology shocks are activated.
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